SEPTEMBER 1965

MONTHLY REVIEW

N INDEPENDENT SOCIALIST MAGAZINE

VOL. 17

4

THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC:

REVOLUTION AND COUNTER-REVOLUTION

THE EDITORS

IMPERIALISM

VICENTE GIRBAU LEON

Socialism and the Market

MAURICE DOBB
CHARLES BETTELHEIM

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CONTENTS | VOLUME SEVENTEEN NUMBER FOUR SEPTEMBER 1965

REVIEW OF THE MONTH: Revolution and Counter-Revolution in the Dominican Republic 1
IMPERIALISM IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC by Vicente Girbau Leon 9
SOCIALISM AND THE MARKET by Maurice Dobb, Charles Bettelheim, and a Specialist 30
JOB DISCRIMINATION IN THE SOUTH by David Michaels 40
WORLD EVENTS by Scott Nearing 50
BOOKS: CHINA: A SPANISH VIEW by Keith Buchanan 56

MONTHLY REVIEW: Published monthly except July and August when bimonthly, and copyright ©1965, by Monthly Review, Inc. Second class postage paid at New York, N. Y.
EDITORIAL AND BUSINESS: 333 Sixth Avenue, New York, New York 10014. Telephone: CHelsea 2-6494. Unsolicited manuscripts will not be returned unless accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed envelope.
NEWSSTAND DISTRIBUTOR: B. De Boer, 188 High Street, Nutley, N. J.
SUBSCRIPTION PRICE: One year—$6 in the U.S.; $7 foreign. By 1st class mail—U.S. $9; elsewhere $11. By air mail—No. America $11; So. America and Europe $15; Asia (incl. USSR), Africa, Australia $17.
EDITORS: Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy.

NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

In the 13-year-old history of MR Press we have never published a more important group of books than those advertised in this issue of MR. Scholars in many countries abroad have been writing us for years, "When will the Baran-Sweezy book on Monopoly Capital be out?" Now at long last, we are happy to announce that the ms. is completed and production will start in a few weeks. The table of contents and other details are on the back cover. Because the book is fairly long and contains many footnotes, we doubt it will be ready for Christmas, but we shall do our utmost to have it off the press as soon as possible.

Of the six other new titles described on pages 32-33, only one, *Mau-Mau From Within*, will not be available by Christmas. Production on this book has been delayed because an English publisher has expressed a keen interest in the book, and arrangements are being made for simultaneous publication in both countries.

(*continued on inside back cover*)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REVOLUTION AND COUNTER-REVOLUTION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

The twentieth-century history of the Dominican Republic and its relations with the United States, ably summarized and analyzed in the article by Vicente Girbau beginning on page 9 below, displays in microcosm all the essentials of the experience of Latin America as a whole. And we see no reason to doubt that what is now happening in the Dominican Republic is prophetic of what will happen throughout Latin America in the period ahead.

Perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the Dominican situation, and in a sense the key to its real meaning, is why the Johnson administration decided on massive military intervention only four days after the beginning of the uprising. No one outside the crackpot Right ever thought that Juan Bosch or his Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) was Communist in any of the several meanings of that flexible term. All observers agree that it was Bosch's civilian followers, together with younger military officers disgusted with the rottenness and corruption of the regime which came to power after Bosch's overthrow, who planned the uprising of April 24th. There was never any doubt about the aims of the insurgents: reinstatement of the democratic Constitution of 1962 and restoration of Bosch to the presidency which he had won by a 2-to-1 vote in a free election. And the allegation that the uprising was "taken over" by "Communists" between April 24 and April 28 when the marines landed, was so flimsy that apparently none of the reporters on the spot even took it seriously. (See, for example, the detailed analysis of these matters by the staunchly anti-Communist Theodore Draper in the *New Leader* of May 24th.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

What, then, was the real reason for the United States military intervention? Washington of course knew that it was acting in flagrant violation of international law, of the United Nations Charter, and of specific treaty obligations to the Latin American countries. It must have been aware that the intervention would be interpreted all over the world as an act of naked imperialism, that it might be a mortal blow to the Organization of American States, and that millions of people throughout Latin America would conclude that the blocking of Bosch's return to power meant the end of all hope of social reform through legal and nonviolent means. In short, Washington must have known that it would have to pay an enormous political price in terms of what Draper called "the incalculable consequences of this adventure for years to come and in countries near and far." What persuaded Washington that it was nevertheless worthwhile to pay this price?

Probably the explanation most widely accepted among liberal and social democratic critics of Johnson's Dominican policy runs in terms of personalities. According to this view, the Embassy in Santo Domingo and the people responsible for making policy recommendations in the State Department are reactionaries or narrow-minded upper-class snobs who don't like democracy anyway and naturally support the Latin American oligarchies in their determination to hang onto their privileges at whatever cost. Through biased and/or falsified intelligence and bad advice, these people scared Johnson and his top aides into committing the grave blunder of intervening militarily against one of their most loyal and potentially effective allies, Juan Bosch. Tad Szulc, who covered the first few weeks of the Dominican crisis for the *New York Times,* presents an argument along these lines in the *Saturday Evening Post* of July 31st; and the evidence he adduces certainly shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the Embassy and State Department officials dealing with Dominican affairs were on the whole an ignorant, prejudiced, and incompetent lot who did their best to bring about exactly what happened. If we are nevertheless unwilling to accept this as an *explanation* of what happened, it is because we do not for a moment believe that the top policy makers in Washington—Johnson, Rusk, Bundy, McNamara,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the military leaders in the Pentagon—are such weak fools as the argument obviously implies. It is much wiser to assume that they knew perfectly well what they were doing and were willing to pay the high political price of military intervention because they believed the alternative to be more dangerous.

What could have led them to this belief?

The answer must be sought in the actual course and chronology of events in Santo Domingo. (In what follows we rely on the account presented by Tad Szulc in the *Saturday Evening Post* article cited above.) The uprising began early Saturday afternoon, April 24, when rebel civilians captured the main radio and TV station in Santo Domingo and announced that the government had fallen. They were immediately joined by two army camps on the outskirts of the city. Crowds rushed into the streets to celebrate what they thought was already a victorious revolution. However, the illusion was short-lived: government forces soon recaptured the radio station and issued an ultimatum to the army camps to surrender by 5 p.m. The military was now sharply split into two factions—one centering on the two rebellious army camps and the other, under the command of General Wessin, on the San Isidro air force base a dozen miles outside the capital. A clash was unavoidable, and the fact that the San Isidro faction had control over the available planes and tanks gave it a definite military advantage. It was undoubtedly with a view to offsetting this advantage that the leaders of the uprising took a fateful step: they opened the arsenals of the two army camps and the downtown police stations under their control. In Szulc's words, "men, women, and teen-agers—Communists and non-Communists alike—were allowed to help themselves to anything they wanted. Suddenly the city turned into an armed camp." It is not clear exactly when this happened, but according to Szulc's account it was an accomplished fact by early Sunday afternoon (April 25). Thereafter it was largely the armed civilians who, with a courage and heroism of the highest order, repulsed Wessin's tanks and brought the old military machine, built up during the Trujillo era and trained and lavishly equipped by the United States, to the brink of total destruction. It was at this point, on April 28th, that Johnson made his decision to send in the marines and para-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

troopers. As Bosch said at the time on the "Face the Nation" TV program: "When they landed, Wessin y Wessin's forces were defeated. Twenty-four hours more and the Dominicans would have solved their own problems."

The statement was of course not literally true: problems like those of the Dominican people cannot be solved in 24 hours, or even in 24 months. But all the same it pointed to the most important truth of all: in another 24 hours the greatest obstacle to the solution of the Dominican people's problems would have been removed. Just as Batista fled from Camp Colombia on the outskirts of Havana on January 1, 1959, so Wessin would have fled from San Isidro on April 29, 1965. Santo Domingo would have been in the hands of its armed citizens, and there is no reason to doubt that the uprising would have spread immediately to the rest of the country.

If we are to understand United States policy, it is necessary to indulge in a little speculative history. What would have happened in the Dominican Republic if the uprising had succeeded as it was on the verge of doing on April 28th?

First, Juan Bosch would have returned to receive a hero's welcome. He would have been reinstated in the presidency, parliament would have reconvened, and the Constitution of 1963 would have been proclaimed the law of the land. Outwardly the situation as it had existed in September, 1963, before the anti-Bosch *coup d'état,* would have been restored. But beneath the surface everything would have been different.

The Dominican Constitution of 1963 was a progressive document along the lines of, though more moderate than, the Cuban Constitution of 1940. It provided for land reform, modern labor and social welfare legislation, separation of church and state, and the usual guarantees of democratic freedoms. Bosch was elected President on a platform promising to implement the Constitution, with his support coming almost entirely from the lower middle and working classes who would be the main beneficiaries. During his seven months in office, however, he was not able to accomplish very much—partly because the existing state apparatus was totally unsuited to the purposes of social reform, but even more because a serious attempt to carry out his promises would necessitate curtailing the privileges of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

oligarchy, and any move in that direction would immediately trigger a military coup against which Bosch had no defenses whatever. The wonder is not that he accomplished little but that he managed to accomplish anything at all and to remain in office for a period of months rather than days.

How different it would have been if Bosch had returned to power last April in the wake of a triumphant revolution! With the old military machine in ruins and the people armed, not only would he have been in a position to carry out the reforms promised in the Constitution of 1963; he would have been under enormous pressure to go faster and further than he and his associates could possibly have contemplated in the conditions of 1962-1963. From being a brake on reform activity, military force would have turned into an accelerator.

There is no mystery about what needed, and still needs, to be done in the Dominican Republic. The people are desperately poor. "Most of them," a reporter quoted a United States marine on duty in Santo Domingo as saying, "are just hungry. That's what the trouble is about." (*New York Times,* May 24.) And the same newspaper the same day carried a Washington dispatch which reads in part:

> A recent economic study presents a grim picture of the Dominican Republic as a land of near-starvation and underscores the grave task that will confront whatever government emerges after the present crisis. . . .
>
> The report was prepared by Nathan Koenig, an economic consultant with the Department of Agriculture, and is based on a first-hand study of farming, food processing and distribution in the Caribbean country. . . .
>
> "An exceptionally large proportion of the population is inadequately fed and poorly nourished," the report says. "Only a small number of people enjoy a reasonably adequate diet."

Any serious attempt to cope with this situation would have to include the liquidation of the miserably inefficient system of latifundism, and the mobilization for domestic investment of the economic surplus which is now consumed or wasted by the local oligarchy or sent abroad as profits and other remittances to parent corporations in the United States. And these steps, it is safe to say, could be carried through only by means of a far-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reaching expropriation of land and capital from the existing owners, Dominican and foreign.

No one can say how Juan Bosch, inescapably confronted with these tasks and backed by an armed citizenry, would have acted. Perhaps he would have allowed himself to be guided by the logic of the situation, as Fidel Castro had done six years earlier when he came to power in a Cuba afflicted with the same problems which face the Dominican Republic today. If Bosch had chosen this course, he could certainly have relied on the enthusiastic support of his armed followers; but just as certainly it would have brought him into increasingly sharp conflict with the privileged minority in his own country and the corporations and their government in the United States. On the other hand, wishing to avoid such a conflict, Bosch might have temporized, carrying out only relatively superficial reforms and hoping to be able to reconstitute a professional military machine while effectively disarming the people. In this he would of course have enjoyed the support of the privileged minority and the United States; the growing conflict would have been between him and his own followers. In this situation, the latter would undoubtedly have turned to more radical leaders who, with the armed citizenry behind them, would have been in a position to oust the president and proceed with a program of fundamental structural reforms.

We are thus led to the conclusion that the triumph of the Dominican uprising would very likely have produced exactly what Washington most feared—another Cuba. Juan Bosch could have led the way if he had chosen to do so; if not he would have been replaced by others with more determination and a greater understanding of the needs of their people. In other words, the particular personality and inclinations of the man in whose name the uprising was organized were not the decisive factors in 1965, any more than his election to the presidency had been in 1962. The decisive factor was the location of armed force—in the right-wing officer corps in 1962-1963, potentially in the armed people in 1965. It was to keep this potentiality from being realized that Washington was prepared to pay the enormous political price entailed in open military intervention. And from Washington's point of view—that is, the point of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

view of the giant multinational corporations—the decision was unquestionably a rational one. A victory for the Dominican Revolution would have meant not only the loss of the hundreds of millions of dollars invested in that small country; even more important, it would have given an enormous boost to the revolutionary forces all over the world struggling to escape from the oppression and exploitation of monopoly capital and its local henchmen and allies.

Recent Dominican experience thus proves once again the truth of Mao Tse-tung's dictum that political power grows out of the barrel of a gun. It also proves that the men in charge of the Washington government are better political scientists than their liberal critics. And it proves something else too: that the substitution of an American counter-revolutionary military force for a Dominican counter-revolutionary force cannot solve a single one of the problems that gave rise to the uprising in the first place. On the contrary, it has exacerbated all these problems and added new ones. Writing from Santo Domingo on May 14th, Tad Szulc stated:

> A growing consensus among Dominicans and Americans here is that the United States may now be forced to keep occupation troops here for long months, if not years, amid the rising hatred of the Dominicans, who greatly admired the United States until recently. (*New York Times,* May 15.)

How great the admiration for the United States may have once been we do not know, but at any rate nothing that has happened in the nearly three months since this was written has cast doubt on the rest of the statement. Whatever "solution" is worked out to the problem of forming a new Dominican government—and as of early August none is in sight—it is clear that real power will continue to grow out of the barrels of American guns.

Every effort will no doubt be made to disguise this fact. A new army of Dominican mercenaries will be organized and trained under new Trujillos. The regime of murder and torture which Trujillo and his successors maintained for more than a quarter of a century will be continued, with Dominicans doing most of the dirty work. But all these will be mere instruments

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of American rule, and they will not obviate the necessity for the United States to keep in being a permanent occupation force either in the Dominican Republic itself or ready at a moment's notice to re-invade the country.

But this is not all. It is certain that the Dominican people will not voluntarily surrender the arms they acquired during the first days of the uprising. Already newspaper accounts speak of massive smuggling of guns and ammunition out of Santo Domingo to hiding places in the countryside, and this movement will doubtless be accelerated if and when the Constitutionalist leaders sign some sort of agreement with the Americans and their San Isidro puppets. (It is also possible that no such agreement will be concluded and that the problem will be "solved" by an all-out assault on downtown Santo Domingo. But the Americans are obviously anxious to avoid such a bloody debacle, which could only have the effect of hastening developments in the rest of Latin America.) "There will," says an editorial in the *New York Times* of August 2nd, "certainly be student fighters in the mountains of the Dominican Republic when a settlement of the political situation is reached." One can go further and predict that to an ever increasing extent violent repression and violent resistance will be the dominant modes of life in the Dominican Republic. Such are the fruits of foreign-imposed counter-revolution.

If we focus exclusively on the Dominican Republic there is no visible way out of the impasse: the United States clearly has the military power to maintain the occupation indefinitely. But revolution and counter-revolution in the Dominican Republic are not isolated phenomena. They are part of a developing world-wide struggle which has already burst into open flames in Southeast Asia and Central Africa and which is flickering and smoldering throughout the colonial, semi-colonial, and neo-colonial world. Has the United States the power to stamp out or control the fire throughout the vast regions of Asia, Africa, and Latin America? This is the decisive question of the second half of the twentieth century on which ultimately the fate of us all depends.

Those of us who do not think so, who believe that sooner or later the people of the United States themselves are going to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have to choose between being bled white and forcing their rulers to come to terms with history, can only hope that the lessons of the Dominican affair will be well learned. Counter-revolutionary force solves nothing: it merely breeds more crises and more violence, and in the long run it will lead to the destruction of those who use it.

(August 5, 1965)

IMPERIALISM IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

BY VICENTE GIRBAU LEON

When President Johnson ordered troops to land in Santo Domingo, he liquidated by this act 30 years of North American efforts to change the forms of its hemispheric politics. The United States has always thought, as Cleveland said, that it practically had sovereignty over the entire South American continent, but in 1932, when Roosevelt became president, the procedures changed; the brutal and arrogant forms utilized until then, which had found their maximum expression in the other Roosevelt, were exchanged for more subtle means.

The "good neighbor policy" produced, among other things, the institutionalization of the principle of non-intervention in the Treaty of Rio. Later, when it was seen that perhaps these more civilized forms were not enough, Kennedy launched the Alliance for Progress, which formally recognized the necessity for the

---

Vicente Girbau Leon is a former Spanish diplomat who broke with Franco. He is now working on a book on the history of Franco's diplomacy. Sr. Girbau has written us saying he would like to dedicate this article "to Hugo and to all my brothers in Santo Domingo." The translation from the Spanish is by Nell Salm.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

economic and social transformation of Latin America. This policy was supported by a number of moderate reformers who wanted to carry out their reforms in cooperation with the United States—politicians like the Costa Rican José Figueres, the Peruvian Victor Haya de la Torre, the Puerto Rican Luis Muñoz Marín, the Venezuelan Rómulo Betancourt, the Guatemalan Juan José Arévalo, the Argentine Arturo Frondizi, the Dominican Juan Bosch.

A little more than a year after the assassination of Kennedy, Johnson once more brandished "the big stick" to prevent the re-establishment of constitutional legality and the reassumption by Juan Bosch of his functions as freely elected president. This was to bury all subtlety and to crush the liberal reformers. It was also perhaps the beginning of a long war in the Americas which may be one of the most tragic episodes in the history of the world.

Pre-Trujillo Santo Domingo

The Dominican Republic has suffered an even more tragic and stormy history than the other countries that succeeded to the old Spanish empire. Under Spanish dominion it was of secondary importance, compared with the continental countries. When it proclaimed its independence in 1821 it was a country of few people and resources; thus it decided to become a part of the "Great Colombia" projected by Bolivar. But Bolivar was far away and still involved in wars of independence, while nearby Haiti, independent for years, had passed through a social and racial revolution and had an army and administration efficiently organized by figures like Toussaint-L'Ouverture, Dessalines, and Christophe. For 23 years Santo Domingo remained under Haitian domination, from which it emerged even more impoverished. On either side of her—in Cuba and in Puerto Rico—Spain still existed, and to the North the United States had already become a great power. Santo Domingo looked from one country to another for protection from the Haitians. In 1861, Santana proclaimed its annexation to Spain, which ended four years later with the uprising of Luperón; then Buenaventura Paez flirted with the idea of annexation to the United States; President Grant was also interested, but the Senate was opposed. By

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the end of the century Santo Domingo's independence was assured, but the country was one of the most unstable of all the Americas.

From 1882 to 1889, Ulises Heuraux, governing by himself or through an intermediary, achieved a certain stability. Heuraux undertook a politics of public works and, since Europe and the United States overflowed with capital searching for outlets, contracted for one loan after another. This is something which occurred in all the countries of the region (and not only of that region), and it put them under the domination of European or American finance capital, conveniently supported by the warships of the countries of origin. By the time Heuraux was assassinated in 1889, the Dominican foreign debt had multiplied tenfold, and the interest absorbed almost the entire national income. This situation contained evident risks for Santo Domingo, but it preoccupied no less the American government, which was not disposed to permit European competition in the region.

If the American administrations have always considered that they have actual sovereignty over the whole continent, their will to dominate the Antilles has been even more clear. President Adams had already said that it would suit the United States if Spain held onto Cuba until the U.S. was ready to annex it; in 1826 he gave instructions to the Congress of Panama to oppose the independence of the Antilles. Three quarters of a century later the United States did possess Puerto Rico and had the contractual right to intervene in Cuba, guaranteed by the Platt Amendment. By this time, the American banks, with the support of the Department of State, had become the guarantors of the public debt of Santo Domingo and of other countries, and immediately the American government claimed economic control to guarantee the payment of the debt. In 1905, Santo Domingo was occupied for the first time by the marines, and Teddy Roosevelt arranged to have import duties distributed so that over 55 percent went to creditors and 45 percent to the Dominican government. The pact of 1907 sanctioned this distribution, put customs duties under the control of North American officials, and prohibited the Dominican Republic from contracting new loans without previous permission from the United States. This clause served as the pretext for the occupation of 1916, whose

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

objective was, in reality, to complete the strategic control of the zone and the penetration of finance capital.

President Wilson, not succeeding in establishing a docile Dominican government, ordained a direct military government, with a state of war and military censorship. Of course, during the eight years of occupation, considerable public works and material improvements were carried out. Native small industry was initiated, and with its creation an incipient bourgeoisie came into being. But in the countryside feudal structures were reinforced; the *latifundios* of the old families and the great plantations of the American companies were created or enlarged by means of the purchase at reduced prices of the best lands, or by the expulsion of the peasants who did not wish to sell, carried out with the brutal procedures common in colonial lands. By 1924 absolute control of the Dominican economy had been completed; with the exception of a few small enterprises, all the sugar works of Santo Domingo were the property of the two big North American companies—the Barahona and the Central Romana Sugar Company. At the same time, the Americans created an efficient and docile administration and an armed force; the old army was dissolved and replaced by a modern national police force, the nucleus of the future Trujillo army. In this force a modest telegraph employee named Rafael Leónidas Trujillo took his first steps. He was intelligent and efficient, and he cooperated in the fight against the peasants who protested the disguised expropriations. By the end of the occupation, Trujillo was already head of the National Police.

Fed by patriotic sentiment, the rebellion of the dispossessed peasants, the brutal and arrogant methods of the occupier, and the offensive attitude of Yankee soldiers toward a largely mulatto population, national resistance did not cease during the eight years of occupation. This spirit of resistance against the imperialist occupation culminated when the occupation ended, in an alliance of the nationalist middle classes with the popular masses. General Horacio Vázquez, representative of the old oligarchies, governed for six years and then, in 1930, tried to reform the constitution in order to continue in power. But the crisis of 1929 had increased the misery of the poor to such an extent that a popular rebellion, headed by Rafael Estrella Ureña,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

who had distinguished himself in the fight against the occupation, obliged Vázquez to take refuge in the American Embassy. Trujillo, already chief of the army, supported Estrella; once Vázquez was out of the picture he was going to be the Americans' trump card against Estrella Ureña. Supported by the army and the American Embassy, he became a candidate and, after some violent and fraudulent elections, was elected president. On May 16, 1930, the Trujillo era began.

The Trujillo Era

Trujillo was, probably, the bloodiest of the Latin American dictators, but he was also something else, as a result of the capitalist transformation of Dominican agriculture, the incipient industrialization, and the administrative and police machinery inherited from the occupier. "Trujillo understood from the beginning the real essence of the modern state: that is to say that the state—whatever its form—has as its basis the continual progress of capitalist production."* He established a military dictatorship in the service of the great foreign plantations and the creole oligarchy. But, little by little, using the powerful state apparatus at his disposal, he reduced the interests of these classes to the benefit of his own family and a small circle of intimates.

In 1962, the Council of State that presided at the elections won by Bosch published the following data on the share of the national riches possessed by Trujillo at the moment of his death: 22 percent of bank deposits, 63 percent of the production of sugar, 63 percent of cement, 73 percent of paper, 86 percent of paint, 71 percent of tobacco, 85 percent of milk, 68 percent of flour. Moreover, the Dominican airline was his, as were the principal newspapers and most of the radio and television stations. According to the *Basel National Zeitung,* Trujillo had deposited $200 million in Swiss banks and it was known also that he had deposited $35 million in the Canadian Bank of Nova Scotia.** He possessed, according to Cordero, 30 percent of the

* José R. Cordero, *Informe sobre la República Dominicana.* Cordero died in 1959, during the invasion of June 14; he was a graduate of the Universities of Paris, London, and Wisconsin. I have read a typed copy of his report; I do not know if it has been published.

** *Hispanic American Report,* Stanford University, Vol. XV, No. 12, p. 1114.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

land and 25 percent of the livestock. In addition, monopolies were created in 1954 to control all foreign and domestic commerce; 51 percent of their stocks were the property of Trujillo, and the rest belonged to his followers. All the banks of Santo Domingo were his or American.

Compared to the oldtime chiefs, who had earned their stripes in wars and revolutions, Trujillo was a *nouveau riche*, a military official; he did not belong to any of the great Dominican families. The old chiefs were from the country, owners of immense properties where they exercised a semi-feudal paternalism. They were the heirs of the Spanish commissioners, and gentlemen. These elements of Dominican society were already obviously decadent when Trujillo came to power. There were some uprisings, like that of Desiderio Arias which involved the entire Cibao region, but they were promptly quelled. A refined technique was employed for this: individuals from one family were sent to govern provinces which constituted feudalities of others; this facilitated the carrying out of the assassinations later ordered by Trujillo. The sons of the old chiefs ended up in Trujillo's army.

The Second World War brought some changes. In the first place, there was an enormous development of the productive forces in all the Americas. The United States had to substitute Latin American sources of raw materials for many suppliers occupied by the enemy, and for this reason, as well as to assure the collaboration of the countries of the continent, concluded with all these countries favorable economic agreements. In the second place, the democratic forces were to enjoy the favor of the State Department for some time. Trujillo adapted himself, and in 1946 conceded a general amnesty and freedom of the press and of association. But this period lasted scarcely eight months and, while the political groups showed signs of great combativeness, they did not show much political sense. When they came to represent a threat for Trujillo, he responded once more with prison and death for his opponents.

With the peak of the Cold War and of McCarthyism, the United States soon changed its attitude. In Latin America, by 1953, 15 dictators were in power in 20 countries—Somoza,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Trujillo, Batista, Pérez Jiménez, Rojas Pinilla, Odría, Perón. . . . The Latin American governors submitted docilely to the will of the North, and when one didn't—or went too far—the task of eliminating him was embarked upon.

The early 1950's saw the culmination of Trujilloism. They were years of expansion and of enormous profits for the corrupt minorities that governed the countries of Latin America. In Santo Domingo all the strength of the state was exerted toward the systematic and monopolistic exploitation of the country for the benefit of North American interests and those of Trujillo and his cronies. Once again large-scale expropriations took place to make way for new agricultural or mining developments. Industry grew in the hands of the dictator and his favorites, served by a sub-proletariat formed by the dispossessed peasants.

Trujillo became a continental power. His agents infiltrated into all the chancelleries of America. Politicians from all the countries of the continent were on his payroll. Not even abroad could the Dominicans escape his hand, which overtook even foreigners who got in his way.

But toward the middle of the decade the fall in the price of primary products increased the misery of the masses in all of Latin America and threatened the profits of the privileged. Moreover, large sectors of the middle-class youth of the continent were rebelling against a situation in which they could become privileged—but at the price of submission to corrupt dictators propped up by foreigners, and the most complete national and personal frustration. A revolutionary wave shook all the countries of the continent and the dictators fell one after another. In 1958 the Venezuelan Revolution took place, and in 1959 the Cuban. In 1960, of the old dictatorships, there remained only those of Nicaragua, Haiti, Santo Domingo and Paraguay.

The revolutionary wave reached even Santo Domingo. On the 14th of June, 1959, a group of young Dominicans tried to emulate the adventure of the Sierra Maestra. The situation was not favorable and the movement failed. But the landing, carried out by young people belonging for the most part to the middle

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and upper middle classes, shook the nation. In January, 1960, a plot was discovered in which prominent figures in Dominican society had participated; after that, torture and repression reached incredible extremes. In February, 1960, *Life* published a report describing the terrible tortures to which men and women who had participated in the plot were subjected. After suffering them, they were thrown naked in piles into cells full to overflowing.

At this time John XXIII was seated on the papal throne and the papal nuncio wanted to disassociate the Dominican Church from Trujillo's bloody and shaky tyranny; but it wasn't an easy thing to oblige bishops accustomed to be "defenders of order" and intimately tied to Trujillo to take this position. After several days of contention the nuncio got them to sign a document (a watered-down version of the one he had proposed), asking Trujillo to "respect human rights in these sad hours for the Dominican family." Trujillo reacted violently, and this set the Church against him, especially the lower clergy. A little later they denied him the title of "Benefactor of the Dominican Church," which he wanted to add to his collection.

Trujillo defended himself by attacking violently inside and outside Santo Domingo. On June 24, 1960, his agents tried to assassinate Rómulo Betancourt. This was the beginning of the end. The OAS, in an emergency meeting, decided on a collective break of diplomatic relations and later imposed economic sanctions. The government of the United States seemed decided to eliminate Trujillo: it could not continue to support him if it wanted the Latin countries to support the United States in its fight against Castro.*

Abandoned by his protectors, hated by his countrymen, crowded into a corner by the other countries of Latin America, his country in a desperate economic situation, Trujillo's days

* In reality, the exports of Dominican sugar to the United States did not diminish. Documents found after the fall of Trujillo show that Rep. Harold D. Cooley of North Carolina not only succeeded in impeding the carrying out of the sanctions but had part of the Cuban sugar quota assigned to Trujillo. Cooley was invited to spend a de luxe vacation in Santo Domingo. He did not go but his sister's family went, as well as the families of Representatives Poage of Texas, Abernethy of Mississippi, and Jennings of Virginia. (*Hispanic American Report,* Vol. XV, No. 7, p. 661.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

were numbered. On May 30, 1961, with his assassination, the Trujillo era ended.

The Present Forces

In order to understand the background of the present tragic confrontation, we must briefly examine the economic and social structure of Santo Domingo. Cordero's report is already somewhat dated, but we do not think the situation has changed essentially, except, naturally, in connection with the property of Trujillo, which has been one of the bones of contention of these past years. According to the census of 1960, 69.5 percent of the Dominican population lives from agriculture; 22.3 percent of this portion of the population consists of an agricultural proletariat and 77.7 percent of small proprietors and share-croppers. Ten percent of the working population consists of an urban proletariat, largely, as we have seen, a sub-proletariat of recent origin. The distribution of income is extremely unequal.

Agriculture has always been affected by the evils of *latifundio* and *minifundio,* characteristics accentuated by the expulsions carried out by the Americans and later by Trujillo. These evils are characteristic of all plantation economies: monoculture (50 percent of Dominican exports consist of sugar and 35 percent of coffee and cocoa), the direct dependence of the Dominican economy on the world market, the exportation of resources, and the extreme poverty of the agricultural proletariat in contrast to the opulence of the few. As for the *minifundio* sector it is incapable of progress because of the quadruple exploitation of the peasant by the rent he has to pay to the proprietor, taxes, monopolistic commerce, and high rates of interest on loans. The consequence is extremely low agricultural income and seasonal and hidden unemployment. Unemployment sometimes reaches 35 to 40 percent of the population, while during the sugar harvest Haitian peasants are often brought in. The situation of the urban proletariat is also extremely miserable, while the average rate of profit of industrial enterprises in 1957 was, according to Cordero, 40 percent.

After this brief exposition, one can understand the reasons for the very small domestic market: the peasant masses, the proletariat, and the lower middle class consume very little and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the minority consumes principally imported luxuries. One can also understand the very low rate of capitalization, since the sector of the population that monopolizes the income invests it in non-productive speculation or in sumptuous living.

Juan Bosch says that there was no bourgeoisie, properly speaking, in Santo Domingo; there were a few industrial enterprises, but all the big enterprises belonged to Trujillo or to foreigners. Since, on the other hand, the great landowners lived in the cities, living in an urban manner, Bosch suggests that the Dominican society comprised a peasant class, a working class, and middle classes that divided themselves into upper, middle and lower. The upper class was composed of the *latifundistas,* the beneficiaries of Trujilloism, the higher comprador bourgeoisie, high-level officials, the upper hierarchy of the Church and the army. This class, according to Bosch, constituted 0.2 percent of the Dominican society. The lower middle class, risen from the masses and in close contact with them, was made up of small businessmen, artisans, medium-grade officials—approximately eight percent of the total population. The rest, some 20 percent, constituted what Bosch calls the middle middle class—the liberal professions, officials, parasites of foreign capital or of the power structure, people who live by corruption.*

Alongside this stratification, there operated in Santo Domingo another based on caste; on the top were what Bosch calls "first families," descendants of the old families, who might be in desperate financial straits, but who maintained their consciousness of being a privileged caste; next to these were the *nouveaux riches,* wealthy but not belonging to the old families. The rest were the *chusma,* the common people.

This *chusma,* which a few years later would fight with great heroism, was an inert mass at the time of Trujillo's death in 1961. It was an explosive mass, because the world economic situation condemned it to a growing misery, but it would do nothing while no one gave it an objective and confidence in itself. The *Partido Revolucionario Dominicano* (PRD) of Bosch, with a campaign centered on its problems, won the elec-

* *Crisis de la Democracia de América en la República Dominicana,* Centro de Estudios y Documentación Sociales, A.C., Mexico, 1964, Chap. 6.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion of 1962 overwhelmingly. The privileged rose in opposition; these privileged wanted to be Trujillo's heirs, acquiring his property. They were represented by the *Unión Cívica Nacional* (UCN). But in Santo Domingo, as in all of Latin America, the youth of these privileged classes and castes were in open rebellion against them; the majority of these youth became active in the 14th of June Movement (14J) or, to a lesser degree, in the two parties of the extreme left, the *Partido Socialista Popular* (PSP), and the *Movimiento Popular Dominicano* (MPD), or finally, to a still lesser degree, in the *Partido Revolucionario Social Cristiano* (PRSC).*

The army and the Church deserve separate mention. The Dominican Church has always been closely tied to the "first families"; it supported Trujillo up to the eleventh hour when, pressured by the nuncio, it published the previously mentioned

* The PRD was created in exile almost 20 years ago; its strength was the personality of Bosch, the friendship that united the Latin American liberal reformers, and the attacks it received from Trujillo and the Communists. From 1961 to 1963 it developed a skillful campaign which underlined Dominican problems and proposed a reformist program of government. Since the three groups of the extreme Left had boycotted the elections, the PRD received the entire popular vote.

The UCN was created in July, 1961; at first it proclaimed itself a patriotic group whose aim was to liquidate the vestiges of Trujilloism. Thus it was able to count on the support of the revolutionary youth. After Balaguer retired, it became a conservative party and as soon as it lost the elections of 1962, it began to conspire against Bosch and played a major role in the 1963 coup.

The 14J was created in the weeks following the 1959 landing; at the time of Trujillo's demise it was probably the clandestine group with the largest following, and in the months following the death of Trujillo it became one of the three biggest Dominican parties. The 14J, without a precise ideological platform, is a populist revolutionary party, intensely nationalistic and anti-imperialist; after the coup of 1963 it became still more radical but it still has not defined itself as Marxist and has not adopted a class ideology.

The PSP is the Dominican Communist Party.

The MPD was, in the beginning, a party of the far Left but not strictly Marxist; its flag was red and black like that of the Cuban 26th of July movement; later it evolved until today it proclaims itself Marxist-Leninist-Fidelista and is actually a pro-Chinese Communist Party.

The PRSC, which developed between 1961 and 1963, came in third in the elections. After the coup of 1963 it opposed the junta, and in the present crisis it has collaborated with Colonel Caamaño. The fact that its President chose as a place of exile the Chile of Frei indicates the orientation he wished to give the party.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pastoral letter. Later it fought the constitutional government and helped to overthrow it. The army was the principal instrument of Trujilloism. It became possible in the Trujillo army for a simple soldier to become a general in a few years by rendering services—killing, for example, someone that Trujillo wanted eliminated. This mobility and the enormous power that the army enjoyed brought about the fantastic corruption that held sway, and the fact that the military commanders had to be accustomed to kill explains their bestiality.

Finally, the primary force on the scene—that is to say, the United States. The Central Romana Sugar Company, which controls 30 percent of the sugar production, has already been mentioned. There is also the Granada, an affiliate of the United Fruit Company, which controls the banana production, Alcoa, which owns the aluminum deposits, etc. There exist other interests, less structured, but no less effective in helping to shape the politics of the United States: Colonel Gordon Moore, brother-in-law of President Eisenhower, was a partner of Trujillo in the exportation of molasses to the United States; Henry Holland, Assistant Secretary of State in the Eisenhower Administration, was on the payroll of the dictator; Robert Hinshaw, son-in-law of Foster Dulles, and his family were entertained for three months in the Hotel Jaragua, having been flown to the capital in Trujillo's private plane. William D. Fawley, a violent critic of Kennedy on the Cuban situation, conducted various deals with the dictator.*

The Fight for Democracy

The death of Trujillo did not immediately produce any important change in the country. As was logical, given the personality of the killers and the situation in Santo Domingo, the plot involved very few; there was no thought of a popular uprising, and the conspirators would not have desired it. The tyrant-killers belonged to the great Dominican families. They operated in part from personal motives, in part as members of the old class oligarchy, who had never accepted Trujillo as one of them and who resented his domination even more when they

* *Hispanic American Report*, Vol. XVI, No. 5, p. 464.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

saw his throne was shaky. It has been said that the CIA was in the plot: recently General Imbert has said that in order to get rid of him, the Americans would have to "repeat what they did with Trujillo." Since he was one of the assassins, one can only suppose that he knew what he was talking about.

The death of Trujillo produced jubilation among Dominican exiles and in public opinion in Latin America, but nothing happened inside the country. The oldest son of Trujillo, Ramfis, returned rapidly from Europe, was named Chief of Staff, and unleashed a tremendous wave of terror. With Dr. Joaquín Balaguer as President of the Republic,* and with the real power in the hands of Ramfis, an attempt was made to weather the storm or, at least, to gain time.

This situation, however, could only be temporary. In the first place, the very conditions of Trujilloism made it unthinkable that it could survive Trujillo; second, it was obvious that the Dominican people would soon leave behind the historical lethargy in which it found itself; third, it was probable that the Kennedy Administration would favor another solution in the long run.

While uncertainty and terror ruled within the country, abroad the OAS held a meeting and the exiles clamored for their return. Probably as a consequence of the pressures of the OAS, at the beginning of July the return of three leaders of the PRD was authorized. On the 7th the first speeches were made; the public, excited, demonstrated to cries of "Tyrants to the wall!" and "Down with the Trujillos!" and tried to assault the presidential palace, after having set fire to Radio Caribe. The situation had changed radically; popular pressure had begun.

In that same month of July, Balaguer promised that elections would be held in May of 1962, and the principal political groupings made their appearance (with the exception of the PSP and the MPD which were barred from participation).

The elections could hardly help but favor the PRD, which

* Trujillo had not been President since 1952. From 1952 to 1960 his brother, Hector, was President. In 1960 Balaguer was elected, a man so much under the thumb of the dictator that it was said Trujillo would slap him in front of the Council of Ministers.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

became stronger day by day. Its program attracted the masses while the UCN defended itself with a demagogic campaign filled with empty phrases such as "fewer rich and fewer poor," and with insults against the opposing party. When they saw they were lost, they resorted to a witch hunt. Suddenly it was discovered that Bosch was a Communist. From the pulpits and from the newspapers came threats of excommunication for those who would vote for Bosch and some priests refused to celebrate mass for the youth of the PRD; Viriato Fiallo, head of the UCN, declared that his party had to win because "God never makes a mistake." Just before the elections there appeared an article entitled, "Is Juan Bosch a Marxist-Leninist?" written by a Spanish priest, Padre Lautico García, S. J. The attack backfired, because Bosch threatened to retire from the election if he did not receive a public explanation, and in the resulting discussion Bosch won favor. But with all this the future *coup d'état* was being prepared.

The elections were won overwhelmingly by the PRD, which won 628,495 votes, 23 out of 27 Senate seats and 52 out of 74 Assembly seats. The UCN won 315,877 votes, four Senate seats and 21 Assembly seats.

The Constitutional Government

Bosch took office on February 27, 1963, and was ousted on September 23; it cannot be said that he had much time. In these seven months his intelligence and his fundamental honor were confirmed; but perhaps he did not show sufficient skill, energy and decision to face squarely such a difficult situation. His program had as objectives (1) the economic emancipation of Santo Domingo and the industrialization of the country on a capitalist base, thus creating a national bourgeoisie; (2) agrarian reform, thus creating a solid class of independent farmers; and (3) the democratization of Dominican society and culture. Actually, it was a revolution, because in order to apply the program, it would be necessary to take power from those who had it. Thus, it could be anticipated that, insofar as Bosch would attempt to apply his program seriously, he would be ousted, unless a force could be created to defend it. This force existed among the people, who supported him and whose ferment con-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tinued unabated, but the people had to be organized and this only the youth of the parties of the Left could do. But Bosch did not permit them to do so; neither his ideology, his education, nor his pretensions allowed him to accept this necessity. Did he want to gain time or was he perhaps a victim of the illusion, so frequently held by liberals, that it was enough to believe in the force of abstract ideas, forgetting the necessity of backing them up by practical means?

Bosch proceeded immediately to the application of his program. Before taking office he took a trip to the United States, where he talked to Kennedy, Stevenson, Moscoso and other officials responsible for American policy. Then he went to Europe and visited Italy, France, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium and England, on a trip which could be described as "a business trip whose purpose was to secure investments." In fact, he obtained from the Swiss Overseas Industrial and Construction Company a loan of $150 million for hydroelectric works and irrigation. A little later, in some statements published by *El Tiempo* of Bogota, he deplored the fact that the Latin American and African countries were competing for the European market and he proposed the union of all developing countries in defense of their interests.

On February 27 he took over the Presidency, with the blessing of the Americans, since Kennedy sent Vice-President Johnson to attend the inaugural ceremonies. But the inaugural was a new indication of the difficulties of the situation. In his speech Bosch did not even mention Cuba nor the Alliance for Progress, thinking undoubtedly that, whatever he might say, he would be bound to offend some people he needed. After a few days Manuel Tavares of the 14J eulogized the PRD as the agent of a "national, democratic, anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution." Bosch replied with violent anti-Communist diatribes.

The first step had to be the promulgation of the new Constitution. "The Dominican Constitution of 1963," says Bosch, "was timid, conservative in comparison to the Cuban Constitution of 1940," but ". . . it was an anti-Trujilloist Constitution; one which made impossible the domination of the many by the few; one that forbade arbitrary arrests, deporta-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion, torture, and the plundering of property; one that prevented the re-establishment of the gigantic family *latifundios* of the days of the tyranny and the enslavement of the worker who risked his life, under the accusation of being a Communist, if he had the nerve to ask for a raise."* The Constitution condemned *latifundismo* and prohibited foreigners—whether by birth or naturalization—from owning lands under cultivation. It proclaimed free enterprise as a fundamental of industrial development but it also proclaimed the right of workers to participate in the profits and in the planning of enterprises. It enunciated all the human rights and the principles of social security, and established the obligation of citizens to defend those rights by every means within their power; it established universal and free primary and secondary education, proclaimed science as the base of education and made all schools subject to state inspection. Finally, it separated church and state and established civil marriage and divorce.

The Constitution was drawn up rapidly and promulgated on April 29. What was more grave, Bosch showed signs of wanting to apply it. Exiles returned to Santo Domingo and all parties were permitted. The government kept control over the enterprises of Trujillo and started to locate peasants on his lands and to encourage the organization of agricultural and fishing cooperatives. At the same time, Bosch undertook a battle against corruption and began to apply an austerity program, reducing expenses and salaries of officials.

All those whose privileges were threatened redoubled their attacks. When the projected Constitution was published at the end of January, the Bishop of Santo Domingo attacked it saying that it "did not recognize the rights of God." Viriato Fiallo asserted that it did not recognize private property. And when the Constitution was promulgated, the ecclesiastical authorities refused to attend the ceremony and Viriato Fiallo wrote in *El Caribe* that Communists occupied key posts in the government although, when questioned on this point, he could not name any.

Kennedy maintained his support for Bosch until the end,

* Bosch, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

but other forces in American foreign politics soon declared war on him. The journalist Hans Hendrix, with an enthusiasm worthy of a better cause, dedicated himself to the slander of Bosch in the entire American press. Representative Armstead Selden (Alabama) declared in the House that Bosch constituted a danger for the hemisphere. The FBI and the CIA questioned Dominican visitors to the United States about Communist infiltration.

Bosch continued governing as best he knew how to. That spring the price of sugar had risen enormously. The government decided to appropriate the excess profits—and the Romana Sugar Company declared war. The Council of State (created after the death of Trujillo to retain power until elections could be held) had concluded an excessively onerous contract with Standard Oil. The contract was annulled—and Standard Oil declared war. Bosch even tried to do away with the commissions that the military were accustomed to collect on the slightest pretext. That President knew no limits! He had to be gotten rid of.

In July General Wessin, who already commanded the San Isidro base, demanded that he suppress the three parties of the Left and deport their leaders. Bosch not only did not submit but he publicly denounced the pressure brought to bear on him. At the beginning of August the Bishop of Santo Domingo declared that the Catholics had to save the country from Communism and immediately began to organize the chosen people. Bosch did not give in to these threats, but he failed to organize his defense. The Federation of Students offered to organize a block by block defense of constitutional government, but Bosch put the matter aside.

Finally, on September 23, Generals Wessin and Imbert, supported by the UCN and the Church, deposed Bosch. On the following day, Viriato Fiallo and others, in a solemn document, gave their blessing to the pronouncement in the name of the "first families."

Dictatorship Again

The ousting of Bosch was one of the most irrational and absurd things that the Dominican oligarchies could have done. After 31 years of Trujillo, it was a singular stroke of luck to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have found a Bosch—a man of moderation who proposed a series of reforms which, once applied, would have permitted the beginning of the transformation of the country. These reforms meant the oligarchies would have had to sacrifice some of their traditional privileges, but their country would not have been ravaged by a revolution. The idea of deposing Bosch could only grow in the heads of those who believe that the *chusma* does not belong to the same species as themselves and, for that reason, insofar as they agitate, according to the phrase attributed to Imbert by foreign correspondents, they have to be smashed over the head.

Especially astonishing is the fact that the ecclesiastical hierarchy which had been discredited by its support for Trujillo, should now support the establishment of a sort of neo-Trujilloism. Leaving aside all moral and religious questions, in the present explosive situation in Latin America it seems indispensable for the Church to make sure that the exploited masses do not get the impression that the Church sides with the exploiters. As Monsignor Helder Camara, the Archbishop of Recife has said, the problem for the Catholic Church is not that Communists infiltrate revolutionary movements in Latin America, but that so few Catholics infiltrate them.

Resistance to the military coup was considerable. For days and weeks demonstrations succeeded each other uninterruptedly. For example, on October 7, 1963, the national police had to make a bayonet charge against students demonstrating in front of the National Palace. On October 10 the deposed Assembly met clandestinely and elected Sr. Cassanovas, who had been President of the Senate, as provisional President. In November the MPD started a guerrilla movement, doubtless with insufficient preparation, since López Molina and eight other leaders were arrested before they entered combat. In December the 14J rebelled; groups of 10 to 40 combatants appeared throughout the Republic, especially in the provinces of Puerto Plata and Barahona. These guerrillas failed also; according to the government Manuel Tavares and the principal leaders died in combat, but according to the Latin American press, they were imprisoned and assassinated.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Those who carried out the coup established a triumvirate which represented all the forces that had supported the coup, but soon the moderates in the plunder of the government were replaced by the extremists. In December President Emilio de los Santos was replaced by Donald Reid Cabral, probably due to the discomfiture of the former with the brutalities employed against the 14J. Tensions mounted until, in May of 1964, the UCN broke with the government, which it criticized for its weakness before the army. From that moment the government was dominated entirely by the military, the oligarchies and the United States.

Unmitigated corruption reigned during the 20 months of the triumvirate. Soon there was re-established the privilege that authorized the militarists to freely import goods which they transported in warships and air force planes and then sold to the public in so-called military canteens; naturally, this provoked vehement protests from businesses, which saw themselves being ruined. Their pressure brought about the suppression of the military canteens but they were replaced by so-called national police canteens, directed by the Chief of Police, General Belisario Peguera.

> The corruption in the higher ranks of the military was accepted to such an extreme that chiefs of the three services served only three-month terms; this was enough to amass a fortune. . . . Reid Cabral exempted himself from the taxes placed on imported automobiles (he represented the Austin Company). White slavery (controlled by exiled Cubans), traffic in drugs, the profitable business carried on thanks to tax exemptions, the multiplication of houses of prostitution—with all that the Santo Domingo of 1965 resembled the Havana of Batista. It was the desperate desire to clean out this cesspool that animated the rebels of April 24.*

The U.S. Intervention

From whatever point of view it is examined, U.S. intervention in the Dominican revolt was a violation of the UN and the OAS charters, as well as of the general principles of international law and morality. If the sending of troops to a country

---

* Marcel Niedergang, "*Saint-Domingue ou l'illusion lyrique*," *Le Monde*, June 6-7, 1965.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in order to change the government is not an act of aggression and a violation of the principles of civilized coexistence, those words no longer have any meaning.

The American government sought, as usual, the legalization of its acts by the OAS. This time it was obtained with considerable difficulty. All the peoples of Latin America felt themselves threatened and various governments refused to support an action that, as the *New York Times* stated, supposed that the American government reserved the right to elect the governments of the other countries of the continent. At a secret meeting of the Council of the OAS, it seems that the American government had to listen to violent criticisms from almost all the delegates; those of Mexico, Venezuela, Chile and Uruguay openly accused the U.S. of having violated the Charter. It was only several days later that the necessary 14 votes for creating an inter-American force were obtained, and for this it was necessary to count the vote of a Dominican delegate who represented—Reid Cabral. Even after the voting, the dispatch of a Brazilian contingent and some Central American gendarmes was all that was achieved. Without the opportune fall of Goulart of Brazil the year before, the OAS could have foundered.

As for the future, probably when Imbert will have finished the mopping-up and time will have eroded the determination of Caamaño and his men, another amiable Sr. Guzmán will prove acceptable to the tired protaganists. But this is not to say that everything will continue as before. Revolutions never happen in vain; when a people has fought with the courage of the Dominicans, its defeats, short of extermination, are always provisional.

Probably things will not be the same in the rest of Latin America either. The people of Latin America are reaching another peak in their history similar to, but higher than, the one they achieved with independence. Shaken by a gigantic demographic explosion and by a unanimous assumption of historical consciousness on the part of its people, these countries are going to wipe out some of the age-old structures that condemn them to stagnation and misery. And they are going to take their destiny in hand. American tanks will not prevent this. The

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

United States can help, or simply permit, this process to take place—or make of it an enormous tragedy, involving the terrible death and destruction of modern warfare. But the United States will not be able to prevent the continuation of the process of liberation.

(June, 1965)

The Progress of American Liberalism

We cannot deny to any nation that right whereon our own Government is founded—that every one may govern itself according to whatever form it pleases, and change these forms at its own will; and that it may transact its business with foreign nations through whatever organ it thinks proper, whether King, Convention, Assembly, Committee, President or anything else it may choose.

—Thomas Jefferson

Concessions obtained by financiers must be safeguarded by ministers of State, even if the sovereignty of unwilling nations be outraged in the process.

—Woodrow Wilson

It is going to take a long time to reach an understanding [in the Dominican Republic] and perhaps even after an understanding is reached, it is going to be even more difficult *to force it upon the Dominican people*, which I think is going to be the last and perhaps the most difficult hurdle that we have to contend with. [Italics added.]

—Jack Hood Vaughn, Asst. Secy. of State for Inter-American Affairs, quoted by *The New York Times*, June 14, 1965.

Have You Joined the MR ASSOCIATES?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SOCIALISM AND THE MARKET

The following pieces by Maurice Dobb, Charles Bettelheim, and a specialist on the Soviet economy teaching at a large American university continue a discussion initiated by the Review of the Month for December, 1964. Bettelheim contributed a commentary which was published along with a rejoinder by us in the April, 1965, issue.

Maurice Dobb, the well-known economist, is a Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, and author of two MR Press books (*An Essay on Economic Growth and Planning* and *Capitalism Yesterday and Today*). Charles Bettelheim is Professor of Economics at the Sorbonne, Paris. His piece was translated from the French by Joan Pinkham.—*The Editors*

BY MAURICE DOBB

With the major part of Professor Bettelheim's apt and lucid remarks about planning in socialist countries (MONTHLY REVIEW, April, 1965), I so warmly agree that I am reluctant to express dissent from them at any point. But his brief review of the place of the market in planning is, to my mind, spoiled by some adverse remarks at the end about recent tendencies towards greater use of "material incentives" in socialist countries, including enterprise incentives geared to the "net income" or profitability of the enterprise—remarks which the Editors in their *Reply* underline. This seems to me, if I may say so, a piece of rather romantic dogmatism that is out of accord with the real needs of a socialist planned economy and with historical experience. One wonders, indeed, whether such doubts would have been voiced, let alone given prominence in the first place, had not Peking recently thrown in some rather infantile leftist criticism of other socialist countries for good measure in the current ideological controversy.

I wonder whether Professor Bettelheim objects to the use

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of "material incentives" *at all* or merely to their greater use? If the latter, I should have thought that this was a question to be decided empirically and was not a question of principle. If he objects to their use at all, then it would seem that he must logically object also to any system of payment by results —perhaps even more so, since nothing could be more "individualist" than piece-work wages. If so, then, of course, the criticism of "motivations foreign to socialism" must apply, not only to recent Soviet developments, but to quite early days in the history of the Soviet Revolution when Lenin advocated (against romantics and utopians among the Bolsheviks of that time) the use of just these motivations and material incentives. Indeed, to deny the "socialist" character of material incentives, even on an individual and not a collective or group basis, is, surely, to confuse the distinction between the socialist stage of development and the communist: in which connection one may recall Lenin's statement that "to attempt in practice today to anticipate this future result of a fully developed, fully stabilized and formed, fully expanded and mature communism would be like trying to teach higher mathematics to a 4-year-old child." (*Left Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder*)

But perhaps it is the relation of enterprise-incentives to profitability or net income of the enterprise that is the real ground of objection. It is on this, at any rate, that the Editors seem to focus most attention. It is presumably admitted that *some* incentive at the enterprise level is needed to harmonize the interests of individual enterprises (as operational units in the economic field) with the social interest and with the policy embodied in the economic plan. (I do not see how this can possibly be denied except by one who denies the possibility of so-called "non-antagonistic contradictions" arising between the interests of an enterprise and the collective whole, or else thinks that if these do arise they can be exorcised either by propaganda or by administrative discipline.) If there are to be such incentives, what is it that makes one geared to the net balance-sheet result of the enterprise's activity worse than *other* types of such incentives, such as those geared to fulfillment of a gross production target or to a set of so-called "qualitative" indices—all of which

(continued on page 34)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MR PRESS

FORTHCOMING BOOKS

Our new MR Press titles now on press and soon to be published are among the most distinguished books on our list. They belong in your own library—or they will make ideal Christmas gifts. Order now at the special introductory prices, fill your own needs, and help us by supplying the capital needed for new titles to come. Be sure to enclose payment with your order.

THE TIMELY RAIN: TRAVELS IN NEW TIBET

by Stuart and Roma Gelder

In his Foreword, Edgar Snow writes: "*The Timely Rain* is both news and history to enrich man's knowledge of revolutionary Tibet."

28 color and 40 black-and-white photos

List price: $ 8.95
Introductory offer: $ 6.00

STUDIES IN A DYING COLONIALISM

by Frantz Fanon

with an introduction by Adolfo Gilly

The famous psychiatrist, most revered spokesman for the colonial oppressed, gives a vivid picture of the transformations that took place both in the personality of individuals and in society as a whole in the course of Algeria's struggle for liberation.

List price: $ 4.95
Introductory offer: $ 3.50

LANDS ALIVE (TERRES VIVANTES)

by René Dumont

The world-famous Sorbonne agronomist reports on his findings in more than a dozen countries in Latin America, Africa, India, and Eastern Europe.

List price: $ 6.75
Introductory offer: $ 4.50

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BUY NOW AND SAVE

MAU-MAU FROM WITHIN

by Donald Barnett and Karari Njama

The autobiography of a participant in Kenya's Mau-Mau revolt with a running analysis by an American anthropologist who spent 18 months in Kenya.

"You are helping us all by publishing it. . . . Fascinating reading."—*Basil Davidson*

List price: $10.00
Introductory offer: $ 7.00

THE SOCIALIST REGISTER, 1965

edited by Ralph Miliband and John Saville

Analyses of contemporary issues and ideas by eminent contributors including Isaac Deutscher, George Lukacs, K. S. Karol, Ralph Miliband, and Harry Magdoff.

List price: $ 6.00
Introductory offer: $ 4.00

Set of 1964 and 1965 volumes: Only $8.00

A NEW WORLD IN THE MAKING

by Danilo Dolci

Aldous Huxley called Danilo Dolci, nominee for the Nobel Peace Prize for this year, "the ideal 20th century saint." *The Christian Science Monitor* describes him as "the world's outstanding authority" on the problems afflicting Mafia-ridden Sicily. In this new book, Dolci leaves that poverty-stricken island for a survey of the ways the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Senegal, and Ghana are handling their pressing social problems.

List price: $ 7.50
Introductory offer: $ 5.00

In combination with WASTE, by the same author: Only $9

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(continued from page 31)

have been shown by past experience to have serious practical defects? At any rate, there is nothing new (or Khrushchev-"revisionist") about using a balance-sheet or profitability incentive; here I can't help feeling that the Editors *have* been misled by the short memories of either bourgeois or Peking journalists. The *idea* of profitability as a criterion of the operations of the enterprise goes back to the first affirmations of *Khozraschot* in the 1920's—i.e., it goes back to the time of Lenin; it was reaffirmed as the principle governing the operational independence of the enterprise in 1929, at the beginning of the planning period. The introduction of an enterprise-incentive linked to profitability followed in 1936 with the institution of the Director's Fund (later renamed the Enterprise Fund). Until now, this has not been the only type of incentive, being combined with others, such as the bonuses for plan-fulfillment, and payments into the Fund have been subject to a fairly low ceiling in relation to the total wage-bill. The innovation represented by schemes like those of Liberman and Sik is simply to make profitability (measured over a period of years) the primary basis for incentives (both collective and individual) and a "synthetic" index of enterprise achievement.

It seems hardly necessary to emphasize that "profitability" in this sense, as the balance-sheet surplus or net income of the socialist enterprise, set firmly within the framework of a planned economy, with numerous instruments and levers for setting and steering at least the macro-economic structure, is something entirely different in its significance from profit-motivation and profit-maximization as the fulcrum of economic activity under capitalism. Any analogy between them is a purely formal one; and to emphasize it, I suggest, is to sow confusion (one reason, no doubt, why bourgeois journalists are so keen on this analogy). The question at issue today is simply whether these "instruments and levers" for controlling the economy should be primarily compulsory "administrative" ones (as in the past, with some serious negative results) or should be (as regards micro-economic decisions, at least) less direct "economic" ones operating through the media of prices and incentives.

I entirely agree with both the Editors and with Professor

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Bettelheim that this planned framework needs to include control over prices charged by enterprises—whether in the form of detailed price-fixing as heretofore or in the form of price-ceilings imposed on, at least, the majority of products—as it also needs an economically correct structure (in some sense) of relative prices. I should also agree that at one time the Yugoslav economy probably went too far in this respect in "freeing" the enterprise from controls. But it is incorrect to say that there is no planning of prices in Yugoslavia today. Price-controls have been reintroduced and extended over the past five or six years, and in 1962 there was instituted a Federal Price Control Board to this end.

May I conclude by quoting from an excellent and lucid summing-up of the position in a recent article by Professor Ota Sik of Prague in relation to his own proposals (which in certain respects go beyond those of Professor Liberman)?

> In the period of the Stalin cult, the material interests of the enterprises as communities of producers were disregarded more and more. While formally cost accounting was practiced, the material stimuli to reduce production costs and increase the quantities of value produced and realized, and corresponding to the consumer demand, diminished. . . . Socialist commodity-money relations in conditions of socialist planning presuppose a large measure of independence of the enterprises not only in drawing up plans but also, and even more, in carrying them out, in solving the multitude of problems that crop up from day to day. . . . At the present stage of development of the productive forces, and owing to the present nature of labor processes, material incentives are unquestionably the chief stimulus. The gearing of incentive to quantitative indicators has hitherto been one of the main obstacles to greater efficiency. . . . The new system of management is aimed at creating an economic climate in which the workers, when taking relatively independent decisions concerning their production programme, will have the maximum material incentive to work for the fullest possible satisfaction of the requirements of society and make the most effective use of both labor and means of production.

On the wider question of the relation between planning and the market, he summed up the matter in general terms thus:

> Until recently, the connection between planning and the market was incorrectly understood and the concept of the market was applied to the socialist economy in a sort of shamefaced way.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It was held, wrongly, that planned social coordination, planned management of production, was the absolute antipode of orientation on the market, of utilizing market levers. Planning was assumed to be an attribute of socialism alone, and production for the market a feature solely of capitalism. These tenacious theoretical premises brought much harm. . . . The difference does not consist in production under capitalism being necessarily geared to the market whereas under socialism the market plays no role whatever. Socialist planned production should consistently seek to satisfy market demand. . . . Our production differs from capitalism, not in that it should not meet the requirements of the market, but that it is a *different* kind of production catering for a *different* kind of market. (*World Marxist Review,* London, 1965, No. 3, pp. 17-19.)

BY CHARLES BETTELHEIM

The facts show that the highly centralized forms of planning suitable for a relatively simple economy lead to increasing waste when the economy becomes more complex. The result may be a lower rate of development and even economic stagnation. The Czech economy in recent years can be cited as an example.

The reason for this is that there is no method by which precise and sufficiently detailed information can be made rapidly available, and no coherent, coordinated system of making decisions, both of which are necessary to such forms of planning in a complex society. Hence, there is an increasing waste of resources.

If one wishes to maintain intact the centralized system which was efficient for a simpler economy, it is impossible—given mathematical techniques presently available—to replace on a national scale the bureaucratic and administrative system now functioning in the socialist countries by a system of electronic computers capable of dealing rapidly with all the information necessary to reach effective centralized decisions. Taking into account all possible technical progress, specialists believe that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for heavy industry alone, it will be around 1980 before the Soviet Union can achieve a completely automated system of management, and this may be an optimistic estimate. As for the present rules of centralization, we know that if they were maintained under current methods of handling information, there would be a huge expansion of the planning organs (whose personnel would have to increase two or three times faster than the social product), and the result would only be less and less well-coordinated decisions.

The facts also show that beyond a certain point, waste of resources has a demoralizing effect which can lead to the opposite extreme: a relaxation of all planning discipline.

In practice, this relaxation of discipline makes its way into the economy first of all through the establishment of a parallel system of decision-making. We have witnessed this phenomenon in various places throughout those socialist countries where the economy has reached a high degree of complexity but where they are trying to maintain the extremely centralized system of decision-making that functioned before. We find, on the one hand, an explicit system of centralized rules, which operates more and more slowly and with less and less effectiveness; and, on the other, an underlying system through which those who are actually responsible for production make an increasing number of decisions—which, at the moment, are in violation of the formal rules. This underlying system must be tolerated in practice because without it the economy would lapse into total paralysis.

I think that when we are talking about an enterprise whose profits are collectively owned, it is an arbitrary confusion to identify production "for profit" with profit as "indicator of the efficiency of the management." In such an enterprise, the profit realized on the basis of planned prices and wages is only one of the indicators of the quality of management, the activity of the enterprise—its production and investments—being determined by the Plan, and therefore by social priorities.

Accordingly, I do not think the tendencies to slide into production "for profit" are of the nature and scope attributed to them in MR's reply. They prove that it is necessary to profoundly modify the system of planning and management inherited from the initial phase of socialist construction. On the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

other hand, certain disturbing aspects of these tendencies flow precisely from the absence of sufficiently solid theoretical thought regarding the role of profit as an indicator of the efficiency of management. This is particularly true when no distinction is made between an "indicator of the Plan" and an "incentive." If the present tendencies prove anything, they prove that only by making the necessary distinctions and the preliminary analysis that these imply, can one avoid the double danger: waste and stagnation, or restoration of profit as the goal of production.

We are thus brought back to the need for theoretical analysis of the real social content of state ownership, of the nature of the economic and legal subjects, and of the transformation of socialist relations of production in connection with the development of productive forces.

BY A SPECIALIST

The recent reforms in the economies of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are far from perfect, but they deserve some defense against the all-out attack of Sweezy and Huberman in the April 1965 issue of MONTHLY REVIEW.

(1) Why use profitability as a measure of the firm manager's performance? The reason lies in the very difficult problems that have arisen in using the fulfillment of the plan as the only indicator of performance. In the first place, managers have often tried to get lower plan assignments by understating their firm's capacity. Second, there has been a very serious problem of poor quality goods, since the manager is not penalized for poor quality if he meets the physical volume target. Third, managers have little incentive to overfulfill the plan by much because then next year's target will be raised. Fourth, managers have little incentive to try to introduce new technology because it risks losing bonuses while the change-over is made, and because the plan target will be raised after the change-over is made. Fifth, managers pay little attention to cutting costs, and often spend excessive amounts

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in wasteful ways, because the bonus depends on meeting the target with very little deduction for excess spending. Many other problems in the old system could be mentioned, but these are enough to explain why the manager is asked to concentrate on profitability in the future.

(2) But won't a bonus system for workers and managers based on profitability of the firm lead in the direction of a bourgeois psychology? It is hard to see how any psychology could be more bourgeois than the methods enumerated above for getting bonuses under the old system.

(3) Why is it introduced now? Because the socialist economies are moving into a much more advanced stage of development. Purely central planning is much easier in a simpler, less-developed economy. Czechoslovakia, for example, maintains that central planning did bring it a rapid development in the very obvious tasks of the immediate postwar period. But in 1963 the national product of Czechoslovakia (the most economically advanced of the East European countries) actually fell, and they attribute much of this fall to the inaccuracy of central planning. They feel the economy will grow much more rapidly with many more day-to-day decisions left to the workers and managers on the spot, with their performance judged by the over-all indicator of profitability.

(4) Is this a step in the Yugoslav direction? Certainly, but Yugoslavia is also moving back toward more central control of some things—for example, central control of prices. Even in Yugoslavia, no one gets a share in profits except according to his work in the enterprise. And no one in the other countries is proposing to turn the firm over to workers' councils, but to keep central control by appointing the managers and by other more indirect controls.

(5) Does this detract from central planning? On the contrary, the argument is that the planners will be freed from so much detail in order to concentrate on long run plans, especially investment planning.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

JOB DISCRIMINATION IN THE SOUTH

BY DAVID MICHAELS

The United States South is today the focal point of three key currents in American life:

(1) The Negro liberation struggle, involving a drive for legal rights and socio-economic gains.

(2) A rapidly changing economy, marked by increasing mechanization and automation.

(3) Attempts to deal with these problems by federal legislation, as exemplified by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, establishing a new Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (This Commission started operating on July 2 under the chairmanship of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr.)

While much has been written recently about the Negro movement—including Anne Braden's detailed analysis, "The Southern Freedom Movement in Perspective," in the July-August issue of MONTHLY REVIEW—not much attention has been paid to the implications for it, and for the prospects of Negro gains in the economic field, of the changing Southern economy. The purpose of this article is to attempt to provide both basic data and theoretical tools for understanding the relationships among these various forces.

Specifically, the focus will be on the Negro's position vis-à-vis the critical dynamic sector of the Southern economy—manufacturing. How truly dynamic this sector has been in recent years can be seen from the fact that between 1940 and 1960, manufacturing employment in the South increased by 82 percent, while non-manufacturing employment increased by only 26 percent. (Data for "the South" refer to 16 Southern states plus Washington, D.C.) Hence it seems clear that the Negro's progress, or lack of it, in the South will be increasingly dependent on his position in Southern industry.

David Michaels is the pen name of an economist working in New York.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This article will examine the following: (1) the Negro's present employment status in the South; (2) the historical development of this status; and (3) its likely future development. Within this structure we shall set forth a theory which attempts to explain the developments described. Then, on the basis of this theory, we will develop the prognosis of the final section.

The Southern Negro Worker Today

Data collected in 1960 for the most recent Census of Population allow us to make some important generalizations about the current status of the Negro in Southern manufacturing. To begin with, it is vital to distinguish the position of the Negro male from that of the Negro female. Negro men are employed on a large scale in Southern manufacturing; one out of every five Negro male workers is employed in manufacturing, which is close to the one to four ratio for white males. Thus it seems clear that discrimination against Negro men in Southern manufacturing does not take the form of general mass exclusion. Rather, it involves restricting Negro men to certain industries and certain occupations.

Evidence of "industrial segregation" can be seen from an inter-industry comparison of the Negro's share of the total male employment in the various industries. At one extreme, the Negro percentage was only three percent in aircraft and footwear, four percent in knitting mills and electrical machinery, five percent in motor vehicles, and six percent in non-electrical machinery; at the other extreme, Negroes held 48 percent of all jobs in the logging industry, 39 percent in sawmills and wood products, and 22 percent in primary metal industries.

Occupational discrimination against Negro males is also striking. Over a third of Negro men are employed in the lowest skill category—laborers—while about 45 percent are in the semi-skilled position of operatives, but less than 20 percent are in the generally highest skilled positions of managers, professional and technical workers, salesmen, craftsmen and foremen, and other service workers; moreover, a relatively high proportion of Negroes in this latter group are concentrated in the lowest

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

service positions, such as janitors and porters. The magnitude of this occupational discrimination may be seen from the fact that Negro men fill half of all male laborer jobs in Southern manufacturing, about a sixth of the male operative jobs, but only about one twentieth of all other positions.

The monetary cost to Negroes can be seen from national earnings (1959) in these occupations. Managers in manufacturing made $9,200; salesmen in manufacturing, $6,700; all craftsmen and foremen, $5,200; all clerical workers, $4,800; operatives in manufacturing, $4,400; laborers in manufacturing, $3,600; and janitors, $2,800.

The position of Negro women in manufacturing employment is much simpler and far worse: they are excluded on a mass scale. Of over a million women employed in Southern manufacturing in 1960, only 60,000 were Negroes. To put this in perspective, while about one in five Southern white women workers are employed in manufacturing, only about one in 25 Negro women can obtain the relatively desirable manufacturing jobs.

Education and Discrimination

At this point it may be well to detour for a moment to establish our contention that the existing racial employment patterns in Southern manufacturing are in fact the result of racial discrimination. Defenders or rationalizers of the existing racial division of labor generally use one or more of the following factors to "explain" the Negro's situation: inherent biological inferiority, lack of "on-the-job" training, and lack of education. Most reputable scientists would reject the first factor, while the second is generally attributable to initial racial discrimination itself.

Thus, the only significant factor left is education. Fortunately, data from the 1940 Census on the educational achievement of workers in Southern manufacturing allow us to assess the real significance of this factor. To make this assessment, we first assumed that for all male operatives and laborers, in each of 13 major industry groups, the number of years of schooling completed was the amount required to perform the particular job in each industry. Then, taking the educational achievements

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of Negro male operatives and laborers in manufacturing as a whole, we "place" the Negroes as either laborers or operatives in each industry, according to our hypothetical "required" educational achievement.

When this "educational redistribution" of workers is made, two striking results emerge. First, there would be a large shift of Negroes from laborers' to operatives' jobs: whereas Negroes actually made up 10 percent of male operatives, after the redistribution they would comprise 25 percent, while their share of laborers' jobs would drop from 51 percent to 33 percent. Second, the variation among industries in regard to the proportion of all male Negroes employed as both operatives and laborers would decrease greatly: while the actual distribution of these Negroes among industries ranged from a high of 49 percent to a low of six percent, after the "educational redistribution," the range of variation was sharply reduced, from a high of 34 percent to a low of 19 percent. Thus, even though the average Negro worker has less education than his white counterpart, he is clearly not employed up to the level of his education.

The lack of importance of education in causing the racial employment pattern can be demonstrated quantitatively. If we take both the actual distribution of Negroes among industries and our hypothetical distribution based on education, and compare them with the random distribution of Negroes which would exist if neither education nor racial discrimination had any influence, one sees that discrimination, rather than education, is the key factor. Mathematical analysis indicates that 95 percent of the deviation of the actual distribution of Negroes among industries from the random distribution is attributable to discrimination, and only five perient is explainable by the lower average educational achievement of Negro workers. To put the point in its simplest terms, lack of educational skill cannot explain why Negro college graduates have to work as laborers in lumber mills, while white workers without grade school educations enjoy higher-paying, more pleasant work as operatives in textile mills.

Finally, it should also be noted that the lack of education explains little of the mass exclusion of Negro women from Southern industry. By assuming that the levels of schooling reached by female operatives and laborers in manufacturing,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and female domestic workers, were the necessary ones for adequate performance of their respective jobs, an educational "redistribution" would show a tremendous shift of Negro women from domestic service into manufacturing. Before the redistribution, Negroes comprised 81 percent of all domestic servants and only seven percent of operatives and laborers in manufacturing, whereas after a redistribution they would drop to 60 percent of domestic servants while their share of the manufacturing jobs would zoom to 52 percent. It would seem quite reasonable to assume that women in the South would prefer to work in manufacturing, considering that a domestic servant's work, besides being of the most menial kind, receives the lowest pay of any female occupation in the South. A graphic illustration of this was provided by an incident during the Montgomery bus boycott. A white woman dismissed her Negro servant for refusing to ride the bus. However, she quickly rehired her, because she found that without the work of the Negro woman she could not maintain her home and continue at her job in a textile factory, which paid far more than she paid her Negro servant.

Historical Development of the Negro's Position

In sum, then, the general position of the Southern Negro today is that the male finds extensive occupational discrimination and industrial segregation, and the female encounters mass exclusion, regardless of educational qualifications. It is important for an understanding of the factors underlying this situation to realize that the Negro's position has not always been such. In ante-bellum days, for example, Negroes were spread among many industries, and worked at all skill levels. Slaves were competent carpenters, masons, cobblers, and weavers, and they worked in tobacco factories, iron works, and cotton mills. There was, for example, a cotton mill at Saluda, South Carolina, employing 98 slave operatives and one white supervisor. Also, exclusion of Negro females from Southern manufacturing used to be less complete than at present. Thus, while between 1920 and 1960 the number of white females in Southern manufacturing tripled, the number of Negro women factory workers actually declined!

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

What accounts for the current depressed position of the Negro in Southern manufacturing? The key to the situation is the fact that ever since factory jobs became valued after the Civil War, the Negro has generally been restricted to entering Southern manufacturing at the lowest level, as a laborer. This single phenomenon, called here "occupational discrimination," together with the job structure of Southern industry, explains much of the racial pattern, past and present. The mass exclusion of Negro females can thus be seen as due to the relative lack of laborers' jobs for females *of any race*; in 1960, less than two percent of female workers in manufacturing were employed at this level. The decline of the Negro female's position in the last 40 years can be seen as due largely to the virtual disappearance of these laborers' jobs, which accounted for almost one fifth of all female manufacturing employment in 1920.

Further, the "industrial segregation" of Negro males can be seen as a function of occupational discrimination: the proportion of Negroes employed in a Southern industry varies almost directly with the percentage of laborers' jobs in an industry. For example, in 1960 the lumber and wood industry ranked first among 17 Southern industries in the percentage of Negroes hired (34 percent) and first also in the percentage of all males who worked as laborers (32 percent); the iron and steel industry was second in both categories. At the other extreme, the most discriminatory industry, aircraft and aerospace, with only three percent Negroes, had the lowest proportion of laborers' jobs (one percent). The second most discriminatory industry, electrical machinery, employed the third lowest proportion of laborers, and so on. Right down the line, the ranking of discriminatory industries against laborer-intensive industries turns out to be inversely correlated in an extremely close fashion; mathematical analysis reveals that it is virtually impossible that the relationship is coincidental. Further, even if we examine the percentage of Negroes employed as operatives in an industry, we find that it too depends directly on the percent of laborers' jobs in that industry. The explanation for this phenomenon, we believe, is that due to occupational discrimination, only in industries where Negroes have entered as laborers do they have a chance to be advanced to operatives.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

There is undoubtedly considerable truth to the commonly held belief that Negroes have the lowest paying, least desirable jobs. But here again, occupational discrimination is the main villain. First, it limits so many Negroes to unskilled laborers' jobs, which by their very nature are low paying. Second, those Negroes who manage to get operatives' jobs get them, as we have seen, in industries which have a relatively high proportion of unskilled laborer jobs. And, since the average output for all workers in the industry is lowered by the high proportion of relatively unproductive laborers, and since in every industry there is a structure of wages such that operatives' wages cannot be too much above laborers' wages, operatives in the laborer-intensive industries generally get paid less than operatives in other industries.

Moreover, the Negro's chance, relative to a white's, of getting *even any given laborer's job*, seems statistically to vary with the proportion of laborers' jobs in the industry in question. The reason may well be that the relative proportion of laborers' jobs in an industry, besides being an index of average wages in an industry, is also a good indicator of the degree of unpleasant working conditions. Thus, it is generally agreed that work in a modern, clean airplane factory (which employs one percent laborers) is far more pleasant than in a hot sooty steel mill (employing perhaps 20 percent laborers); in the first we find very few Negroes, even as laborers, while in the second we find a relatively large percentage of Negroes in laborers' as well as operatives' jobs.

World War II and the Postwar Period

Our hypothesis—that occupational discrimination which generally limits Negroes to laborers' jobs is the basic cause of industrial segregation against Negro males and also mass exclusion of Negro females—not only explains the existence of these latter forms of racial discrimination, but also explains developments in racial employment patterns in the last 20 years. The period from 1940 to 1960 has been one of tremendous growth in Southern manufacturing; the number of female workers more than doubled, to over a million, while the number of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

male workers went up by two thirds, to almost three million. Despite this, the proportion of Negro females employed remained pitifully low because of lack of laborers' jobs through which they could gain entry into industry. Negro men also made little progress, with their share of manufacturing jobs dropping from 19 to 15 percent. While this drop was slightly less than the decline in their share of all kinds of employment, both drops reflect the exodus of the Negro from the South, which in turn is at least partly due to manufacturing employment discrimination.

Moreover, Negro men have made virtually no progress in escaping the pattern of industrial segregation discussed previously. For industries on which we have both 1960 and 1940 racial employment data, the rankings according to degree of discrimination have barely changed. The basic reason for this, we believe, is the fact that the relative occupational structure of industries has not changed significantly. For example, the wood and lumber industry in both years employed the highest percentage of laborers, while aircraft employed the smallest percentage of laborers in 1960 and the second smallest in 1940, and so on.

The only significant progress made by Negro men has been a sharp increase in the percentage of Negroes employed in more skilled jobs. In 1940, about two thirds of all Negroes in Southern manufacturing were employed as laborers, while about one fifth were operatives, and only about one tenth were in the remaining (generally more skilled) positions. By 1960, about one third were laborers, while two fifths were operatives, and about one fourth were in other positions. The primary cause of this occupational "upgrading" has been the general upgrading which has taken place in manufacturing all over the country, owing to mechanization and automation. Among all manufacturing workers in the South, from 1940 to 1960 the percentage of laborers dropped from one fourth to one tenth, the proportion of operatives remained constant at one third, and the ratio of all other jobs increased from two fifths to well over one half.

The process of upgrading laborers into operatives was most pronounced from 1940 to 1950, when the proportion of Negro males who were operatives jumped from one fifth to one half while the proportion who were laborers dropped from two thirds

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to less than one half. The process was commented upon in a 1955 study by the National Planning Association, *Selected Studies of Negro Employment in the South*:

> In a number of industries improved technology has brought with it more complex machinery which is in some cases operated by Negro workers. . . . Closely related . . . is the materials-handling revolution which has occurred in many industries since the 1930's. The introduction of gasoline and electric trucks, tractors and hoists of various kinds used in and about warehouses, scrap yards, and similar areas has displaced some Negro workers. But, it has also been rather common for the Negro to take over their operation where they have been introduced, and his skill and responsibility have been accordingly increased.

Unfortunately, however, the general trend in Southern manufacturing toward a smaller proportion of laborers' jobs poses a major threat for Negroes in the future. For the occupational shift in manufacturing as a whole is due not only to upgrading of laborers into operatives, but also to more rapid growth in industries which have a smaller proportion of laborers' jobs to begin with. For example, while the total number of Southern male factory workers increased by 70 percent between 1940 and 1960, the number in the laborer-intensive industries centered on wood and steel remained virtually stagnant, while male employment in industries with relatively few laborers, like aircraft and electrical machinery, skyrocketed tenfold and sevenfold respectively.

More refined statistical analysis of all Southern industries proves that there is a high correlation between the percentage of laborers employed in an industry and the rate of growth of the industry in the last twenty years. The past trend, and the likely future one, is for relatively fast growth in highly skilled industries like aerospace and machinery, and relatively slow growth, at best, in laborer-intensive industries like wood products and primary metals.

Future Prospects

The foregoing analysis implicitly leads to some painful conclusions about the Southern Negro's likely future, if strong positive action is not taken to overcome the trends discussed.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Negro men will continue to be segregated into certain relatively laborer-intensive industries, but these industries will not be the dynamic, growing ones. Thus, employment opportunities for Negro men are not likely to keep pace with total manufacturing job opportunities in the South; this seems particularly true for young Negro males entering the labor force for the first time. Negro women face the prospect of continued mass exclusion from manufacturing employment; they will be restricted to domestic service for white women, many of whom, having no greater skills, will be earning far greater incomes in the very factories from which their servants are barred!

With the rising aspirations generated in the Negro liberation movement running up against this wall of economic discrimination, racial tensions are bound to be greatly increased.

Some will say that the recently passed civil rights law will provide the solution. Others will argue that only a total full-employment policy can generate the jobs necessary to utilize all labor, Negro and white. (Simultaneously, such a policy could help reduce racial tensions, thereby facilitating enforcement of fair employment practices.) However, given the history of employment discrimination in booms as well as depressions, it would seem that some sort of strong federal intervention, like a *truly enforced* fair employment clause, is a necessary, if not sufficient, step. Only time will tell whether the pressures from the liberation movement (and its supporters here and abroad) will be sufficient to generate the action required to overcome the strong socio-economic forces which underlie the facts analyzed in this article.

I am inclined to repeat what you said . . . the other day here: "The Negro will get his due from the Negro—from no one else." I say so, too; that is the whole story, from beginning, middle and end.

—Walt Whitman to Horace Traubel, 1863.

The only thing I really feel is necessary is that the black people, not only in Mississippi, will have to actually upset this apple cart . . . to destroy this system and bring this thing out to the light that has been under the cover all these years.

—Mrs. Fannie Lou Hamer, Vice-Chairman of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, 1965.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WORLD EVENTS

By Scott Nearing

The World Event

Attention, inside and outside the United States, centers increasingly on Vietnam. If President Johnson were trying to follow the advertising line of P. T. Barnum, the circus king: "I do not care what people say, so long as they talk about me," he could hardly have performed differently in his decisions concerning Vietnam.

The Vietnam War is increasing in breadth and depth. It is a war in Asia, homeland of a majority of mankind. It is a war in which the most destructive weapons devised by human inventive genius are being tested out, one by one. It is a war that may reach the proportions of a nuclear-engendered fire-storm that will burn up human civilization. In short, it is a war that must make and keep the headlines in any publication in every language. At this moment the Vietnam War lives up to Barnum's dream: it is the greatest show on earth and the American President has a leading role.

Half a century ago Japanese architects of their Co-Prosperity Sphere in Asia put in a bid for recognition as the most talked-about nation; for a time they succeeded. To win the coveted post of world leadership, they used military conquest, occupation, and economic and political exploitation as their chief instruments of policy. Since war is, to date, the most elaborately staged of all human dramas, Japan made the world's headlines. But since war is the most destructive of all human activities, Japanese warmakers were incinerated and their Co-Prosperity Sphere reduced to ashes in the terrible fire-storm of 1939-1945.

Nazi Germany also employed military might as its chief policy instrument. Germany's Hitler-led Master Race, conquer-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing and desolating half of Europe, won planet-wide publicity in its mad drive for world power. Like the Japanese, the Germans held the headlines for a fleeting moment of history. Then they were burned to a cinder in the same fire-storm of 1939-1945.

With these two latest examples of the fate that has persistently overtaken all of history's warmakers, how can President Johnson, with his hordes of fighters on the borders of East Asia, possibly avoid being the most talked-about, the most feared and hated public figure of this period? His sanctimonious speeches about peace, freedom, and the Great Society, cannot cover up the napalm saturation bombing and wanton destruction which those under his command are showering upon the women, children and men of Vietnam, South and North.

"I hear what you say but I observe what you do" is the saying that most aptly describes President Johnson's role in the tragedy that is engulfing the thirty million people of Vietnam and threatening to extend its infernal influence across Asia and the entire planet.

Vietnam has become THE world event of 1965 as the war in Southeast Asia expands toward Korean (and probably toward continental Asian) proportions while another power-hungry, ill-advised world conqueror moves recklessly along the highway to disaster and destruction.

Washington's Strategy in Vietnam

World reaction to the expanding war in Southeast Asia is picking up momentum. The World Congress on Peace, National Independence and Disarmament brought 1500 participants from a hundred countries to Helsinki, Finland, July 10-15, 1965. Its central theme was the war in Vietnam. Delegates from the 15 countries composing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were meeting at the same time in Paris. The chief subject of the Paris Conference was Vietnam. On Tuesday, July 14, George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State, tried to convince the NATO delegates that developments in Vietnam were critical, not only for the people of the United States but for the other 94 percent of mankind. The Under Secretary warned his fellow delegates that a "rough summer" was ahead.

United States armed forces in Vietnam are rapidly grow-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing. Presently they number some 75,000. Only July 28, President Johnson announced that they were being increased to 125,000. Bombing raids on North Vietnam have brought Washington's war planes within a few miles of the Chinese frontier. Washington has announced, officially, that Hanoi, capital of North Vietnam, is not a "sanctuary"; it will be bombed if necessary. Spokesmen for Peking and Moscow have repeatedly warned Washington that escalation will surely force the Chinese and the Russians to enter the war.

Despite these warnings the Washington administration is proposing an extension of the draft, preparing to call up reserves, enlarging South Vietnamese airfields, building new harbor installations in South Vietnam. These moves imply a greatly expanded war.

The Korean War of 1950-1953 created a critical world situation, with Washington playing the central role of organizing, leading, and directing the war under the slogan: freedom for Asians to resist and eventually to destroy Communism.

Throughout the past fifteen years the movement for Socialism-Communism has made decisive advances in Asia, particularly in South and East Asia. The anti-Communist slogans used in the Korean War are even more noteworthy today than they were in 1950. Meanwhile Washington's policy in the Pacific has matured. The entire Pacific Area is studded with United States island bases. United States armed forces occupy the island chain from the Aleutian Islands through Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan. The United States Seventh Fleet and the Air Force patrol the Pacific as a policeman patrols his beat. As a result of the Korean War, Washington has converted South Korea into a well-armed and equipped base on the mainland of East Asia. In 1965 United States armed forces are taking parallel steps in South Vietnam.

The Philippines were "liberated" in 1898 from Spanish domination. For 67 years they have been militarily occupied by the United States. Japan was "democratized" in 1945. Today it is heavily occupied by United States armed forces. South Korea was made "independent" in 1950. Presently its life is dominated by three divisions of the United States Army.

United States policy in the Pacific is following two definite

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lines: (1) political and military domination of the approaches to the Asian mainland; (2) building bridgeheads, armed and controlled by the United States, on the Asian mainland. South Korea was the first of these bridgeheads; South Vietnam will be the second.

War with Spain in 1898; war with Japan 1941-1945; war in Korea 1950-1963; war in Vietnam 1965 are part and parcel of a general movement that has pushed European "imperial" powers out of Pacific Asia and substituted the "liberating" power of the American Empire.

In the Nick of Time

War in Korea gave the United States economy a "lift" out of the economic stagnation of 1949.

Leading business economists and even government economists are agreed that the record boom of the past four years is coming to an end. The last half of 1965 and the first part of 1966 will be marked by stagnation and perhaps by recession in the United States economy.

President Johnson, determined to have "continued prosperity" during his administration as a necessary means of implementing his over-ambitious domestic and foreign program, is taking a leaf out of President Truman's 1950 notebook. The war in Vietnam comes in the nick of time to give the "lift" which the United States economy needs in 1965-1966.

Another American Interest

Washington is bound to protest and promote "American interests." These interests may be economic, such as former investment in Cuban sugar plantations; or geographic and strategic, such as Taiwan, the center link in the island chain extending from the Aleutians to the Straits of Malacca and thus controlling the western approaches to Asia's mainland. United States interests also may be political, such as the pledge to aid other countries if attacked by a third party. NATO, SEATO, and similar defensive alliances put Washington under obligation to go to the military assistance of more than two-score nations.

Discussions of Southeast Asian policy have brought to light still another American interest: the presence and status of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

United States armed forces. An Associated Press dispatch published July 28, 1965, stressed the vital character of this interest.

On the twelfth anniversary of the July 27th Korean Armistice, United States generals who played prominent parts in the Korean War were asked by the press to comment on the Vietnam War and compare it with the earlier Korean War. General Edward M. Almond, a United States commander in the Korean War, was asked about the desirability of using atomic weapons in Vietnam. He replied: "I have no hesitancy in using any weapon needed to protect our troops in Vietnam." (*Bangor Daily News*, July 28, 1965.)

At this time Washington has nearly a million army, navy, and airforce personnel stationed outside United States frontiers, in most of the strategically important positions on the planet. Wherever they are, these United States troops constitute "an American interest." When this interest is threatened, Washington may use any weapon, conventional or atomic, for its defense. If a war of independence is raging in Southeast Asia, or if a revolution is popping in Santo Domingo, threatening American interests, Washington is prepared to intervene as a matter of routine.

War Is the Handmaid of Imperial Policy

Far back in history, in 1928 to be exact, representatives of the best armed among the world powers (including the United States) drew up and signed a solemn agreement that they would never again use war as an instrument of policy. The Johnson Administration is bombing North Vietnam and building up for a general war in Asia as other imperialists did in the good old days of imperial rivalry and war-making before the Kellogg-Briand Peace Treaty of 1928 was signed.

Why are moral precepts flouted and solemn promises violated? Because "empires are built by the sword." If the Johnson administration is to continue the United States' expansionist policies of the past half century, it must stop Communism and lead the West in the reconquest of Asia. Armed force, and armed force alone, can achieve both of these objectives.

Johnson is like Hitler. He wants peace—a piece of Vietnam and a piece of Santo Domingo. Like Hitler and his many power-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hungry predecessors, he is shooting his way toward a precarious power summit.

How Have the Mighty Fallen

Driven by the threat of pound sterling devaluation, with subsequent devaluation of the unstable United States dollar, the "Labour" Government in London tags along behind Washington as Bill Syke's dog fawned upon his vicious, murderous master.

London's servile backing of Washington's criminal course in South and North Vietnam is the most notorious example of British subservience to North American demands. On June 13, 1965, Prime Minister Wilson's government descended to still lower depths of fawning humiliation.

Traveling to the World Peace Congress, called by the World Peace Council to meet in Helsinki on July 10, Dr. Carlton Goodlett of San Francisco reached the London airport. He was questioned, detained, and shipped back to San Francisco on the first available plane. The United States Embassy in London refused Dr. Goodlett assistance. The British Consul General in San Francisco, on June 25, told a public news conference that Dr. Goodlett had been refused admission to Great Britain because he was on business "inimical to the interests of the free world."

About one hundred American citizens, who were planning to attend the Helsinki Peace Conference as delegates or observers, warned against setting foot on British soil, reached Helsinki by other travel routes.

How typical of United States double-talk and British hypocrisy that this denial of the right to travel should be based on the interests of the "free world"!

The Goodlett case is the latest example of British subservience to Washington's swashbuckling violations of international law and generally recognized human rights. Time was, not too long ago, when the British were masters of the world. Today they are truculent toadies to the American Empire.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BOOKS

CHINA: A SPANISH REVIEW

BY KEITH BUCHANAN

China Triumphs, by Julio Alvarez del Vayo, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1964, $5.00.

It is tempting to title this review "News from Nowhere," since *China Triumphs* deals with that quarter of humanity which is non-existent as far as the U.S. Government is concerned — the 750 million citizens of the Chinese People's Republic.

The book is an important one —and an exasperating one. It is important because of its subject; given the extreme paucity of first-hand reporting in English of what is happening in China, an English translation of a sympathetic study by a Spanish observer must be warmly welcomed. It is important, too, because of the qualifications of the author. At one time he was Foreign Minister of the Spanish Republican Government; then, as an exile, he was a member of the Editorial Board of the distinguished American journal *The Nation* and one of the leading architects of the anti-Franco National Liberation Front. An outstanding journalist, he has twice visited People's China.

The book is exasperating because, in spite of the challenge of the theme and the author's undoubted ability, the book is almost entirely lacking in cohesion or organizing concepts. Valuable and carefully-written sections on topics such as the People's Communes and Chinese foreign policy are juxtaposed with gossiping accounts of the author's visits to celebrated beauty spots, to the Chinese theatre, to Grand Stadium in Peking ("the world championship ping-pong matches were held recently in the covered area") or Peking Central Railway Station ("17 waiting rooms, with a total capacity of 17,000 persons"). . . .

Keith Buchanan teaches geography at Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand, and writes frequently for MR.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Indeed, as he made his way through the book, the reviewer was constantly reminded of that disastrous and digestion-destroying dish—the New Zealand meat pie. In this pie, Down-Under's contribution to *haute cuisine,* fragments of meat and vegetables are set in some mysterious —and vaguely edible—matrix and this in turn in a pastry, frivolously light or sombrely soggy, whose only virtue lies in the fact that it is filling.

Perhaps one should be grateful that in Alvarez del Vayo's book the ratio of meat to matrix, the ratio of solid reporting on the political and economic realities of contemporary China to tourist-style gossip or fill, is relatively high. One can only regret that the author showed so little discrimination when it came to selecting from his undoubtedly wide range of experiences in China, and that he did not offer us a more compressed and analytical account of the critical changes which took place between his first visit in 1957 and his second visit in 1961. And, given the pace of change in China, one can perhaps regret also that the English translation of his impressions should be so belated.

"In China everyone knows why he is working and for whom he is working." These were the words of an elderly craftsman to the author—and this observation goes far towards explaining the remarkable achievements of the last fifteen years, above all the fact that "China has succeeded in establishing the basis for creating its own economy—an economy that will not be subject to the whims of nature or a changing international situation." The youth and enthusiasm of the workers, their confidence in their own abilities, their awareness of the vital importance to the country of their own contribution, the careful fostering of local initiative—all these have contributed in the same direction.

That there have been errors of judgement in economic matters is freely admitted but what is critically important is that these errors have not been persisted in; from such errors the Chinese have learned and as they learned they have made the appropriate adjustments in their economy. They confront a problem of development unique in its dimensions and they have no model on which their planning can be based; under these circumstances such flexibility is absolutely essential. The outside world has difficulty in understanding this and as a consequence has again and again shown an ill-concealed haste to see in every abandoned experiment, every shift in policy, the impending collapse of the Chinese economy. In fact, as the reviewer has commented elsewhere, this capacity for reappraisal is a sign of strength rather than of weakness.

The author emphasizes the importance of what Joseph Needham has termed "the past in China's present"; "everything in New China," he stresses, "is interwoven with and related to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the past. The revolutionary and the classical are joined." He documents the impressive advances made in the field of modern science and especially in the fields of preventive medicine and surgery and comments on the striking changes in social conditions in cities such as Shanghai. He gives a careful account, based on interviews with the Vice-Minister for Agriculture and on his own observations, of the rise of the People's Communes and of recent developments in this sector. He reiterates the fact that, contrary to most Western propagandists, the communes were not "imposed" on a recalcitrant peasantry but developed as a means of confronting new problems of irrigation, mechanization, and the like which arose as the development of the countryside got under way. He comments that some of the problems they face "derive not from excessive despotism, but rather from excessive discussion"; he stresses the range of qualities needed for the successful administration of an enterprise which integrates farming, factory work, and social services. And his observations on the changing resource picture are of special interest to the geographer: the work of Chinese scientists is revealing a wealth of resources formerly unknown or ignored (petroleum is perhaps the most striking example) while planning and the development of new forms of agricultural organization "have narrowed the difference that existed between the parcel of land that was obviously fertile and one that was considered hopelessly sterile."

The one topic on which the average Western reader is either ignorant or misled by propaganda is the Chinese attitude to nuclear war and, more especially, to the test-ban treaty. The position of the Chinese on these two closely-related topics is carefully examined by Alvarez del Vayo: their opposition to the idea of "a super-directorate of two," the United States and the Soviet Union, taking control of the world; their view that the test-ban creates a dangerous and fictitious belief among people that the menace of a nuclear catastrophe has disappeared while, in fact, the manufacture and stock-piling of these weapons of mass-destruction goes on unchecked; their emphasis that the danger of war still exists as long as other weapons of destruction are being developed and that the uncritical enthusiasm for the Moscow treaty (carefully cultivated by both the American and Soviet press) paralyzes the forces of peace. These are weighty objections and they deserve much more serious consideration than has been given them by every organization, every individual concerned with humanity's future.

In spite of its weaknesses, *China Triumphs* is an important addition to the pitifully meager collection of English-language studies of the recent progress of the Chinese People's Republic. And yet, as he closed the book, the reviewer could not but be conscious of the great

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gap between this work, so careful, so painstaking, yet so lacking in real involvement, and the classic reporting of an earlier period—as typified by Edgar Snow's *Red Star Over China* or Jack Belden's *China Shakes the World*. Perhaps it is not sufficient to be merely a sympathetic visitor; one must also share the hardships, the challenges, and the triumphs at the grass-roots level if one is to carry the reader with one in a book such as this—and this, in fact, is how the two most satisfying books in English on post-Revolutionary China came to be written.*

* *China Phoenix* by Peter Townsend and *Revolution in a Chinese Village* by Isabel and David Crook. The author of the first volume spent more than ten years in China, initially with the Friends Ambulance Unit; the authors of the latter first went to China in 1947 and worked in the Shansi-Hopeh-Shantung-Hunan Border Region.

FOR YOUR LIBRARY

Complete Sets of Back Issues of MR

Note: Volumes start with May issue (No. 1) and run through April issue (No. 12) of following year.

Volume		Bound	Unbound
I	1949-50	$ 20.00	$ 15.00
II	1950-51	30.00	25.00*
III	1951-52	15.00	10.00
IV	1952-53	15.00	10.00
V	1953-54	15.00	10.00
VI	1954-55	15.00	10.00
VII	1955-56	15.00	10.00
VIII	1956-57	15.00	10.00
IX	1957-58	15.00	10.00
X	1958-59	20.00	15.00
XI	1959-60	15.00	10.00
XII	1960-61	20.00	15.00**
XIII	1961-62	15.00	10.00
XIV	1962-63	15.00	7.00
XV	1963-64	15.00	7.00
XVI	1964-65	15.00	10.00
Complete Set		$270.00	$184.00

* No. 5 not available unbound.
** No. 3/4 not available unbound.

Send us your order with payment attached.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Five Fresh Works of Scholarship

Produced by the American Institute for Marxist Studies (AIMS)

☐ ONE CONTINUAL CRY: DAVID WALKER'S "APPEAL TO THE COLORED CITIZENS OF THE WORLD" (1829).

The full text of this earliest published expression of militancy by an American Negro, with an essay on Walker's life and times, by Herbert Aptheker.

$4 (cloth); $1.95 (paper)

☐ A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE LATIN AMERICAN LABOR AND TRADE UNION MOVEMENTS

Lists published and unpublished theses, articles, pamphlets, books, in English and six other languages. The only work of its kind, with references through mid-1965.

60¢ (paper)

☐ ETHICS IN THE SOVIET UNION TODAY, by Prof. Howard L. Parsons

An American professor of philosophy, after a year's sabbatical in Socialist countries, examines ethical ideas and problems in today's USSR. $1 (paper)

☐ TEACHING 'ABOUT COMMUNISM' IN U.S. PUBLIC SCHOOLS, by Annette Zelman, with an introduction by Prof. Roland F. Gray

The first documented study, state by state, of the compulsory anti-Communist indoctrination forced upon millions of students, and what can be done about it. Full bibliography. $2 (paper)

☐ MARXISM AND DEMOCRACY, edited by H. Aptheker

Essays by Professors Robert S. Cohen, Howard L. Parsons, Gaylord C. LeRoy, Joseph P. Morray, Jean Suret-Canale, and the Editor, together with a full bibliographical chapter. $3.50 (cloth); $1.95 (paper)

☐ Send sample copy of AIMS Newsletter

Checks may be made payable to AIMS; books will be sent postage prepaid.

American Institute for Marxist Studies (AIMS)
20 East 30th Street
New York, N. Y. 10016

(advertisement)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Get in touch with the new generation!

Read the

YOUNG SOCIALIST

most widely read socialist magazine on the campuses today

Recent Issue Features

The Korean War—What Really Happened

and

The Algerian Revolution

1 Year for $1.00 (bi-monthly)

Young Socialist, PO Box 471, Cooper Sta., N.Y.C., N.Y. 10003

(advertisement)

HALF PRICE

on

THREE BOOKS

by

SCOTT NEARING

THE BRAVE NEW WORLD	list price	$3.50
USA TODAY	list price	$3.50
MAN'S SEARCH FOR THE GOOD LIFE	list price	$1.50
	total	$8.50

These three clothbound books
sent for $4 postpaid

SOCIAL SCIENCE INSTITUTE Harborside, Maine

(advertisement)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MR PRESS BOOKS IN PRINT

(*See page 64 for order blank.*)

		List Price	Price With Sub*
ECONOMICS			
The Political Economy Of Growth—Baran		$ 5.00	$ 9.00
An Essay On Economic Growth And Planning—Dobb		3.50	8.00
Capitalism Yesterday and Today—Dobb	paper	1.00	7.00
The Accumulation Of Capital—Luxemburg	cloth	7.50	11.00
	paper	3.95	8.50
The Theory Of Capitalist Development—Sweezy		6.00	10.00
PHILOSOPHY			
Marxism and Moral Concepts—Ash		3.50	8.00
Pride Of State—Morray		4.00	8.50
Consciencism—Nkrumah		3.50	8.00
The Alienation Of Modern Man—Pappenheim	paper	2.45	7.00
A Philosophy Of Man—Schaff		3.25	8.00
SOCIOLOGY			
The American Revolution—Boggs	paper	1.00	7.00
Caste, Class, And Race—Cox		7.50	11.00
Waste—Dolci		6.75	10.50
SOCIALIST THEORY			
In Place Of Fear—Bevan		4.50	9.00
Marxism Of Our Time—Martinet		3.25	8.00
Parliamentary Socialism—Miliband	paper	3.45	8.00
The Socialist Register, 1964 Miliband and Saville, eds.	cloth	6.00	10.00
The Socialist Register, 1965 Miliband and Saville, eds.	cloth	6.00	10.00
	paper	3.45	8.00
Three Tactics: The Background In Marx—Moore		2.25	7.00
HISTORY			
The Menace Of The Miracle—Abosch		5.00	9.00
Capitalism As A System—Cox		6.50	10.50
Man's Worldly Goods—Huberman	paper	2.95	7.50
We, The People—Huberman		5.00	9.00
From Yalta To Disarmament—Morray		8.50	12.00
Revolution In Seattle—O'Connor		5.00	9.00
The Present As History—Sweezy	paper	2.95	7.50

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

		List Price	Price With Sub*
BIOGRAPHY			
William Morris: The Man And The Myth—Arnot		3.25	8.00
View From The West—Cockburn		3.75	8.50
Tide Without Turning—Gill		4.50	9.00
Paul A. Baran: A Collective Portrait—Sweezy and Huberman, eds.		3.50	8.00
EDUCATION			
Education And The Working Class—Jackson and Marsden		6.75	10.50
Soviet Education Today—Levin		4.00	8.50
WORLD AFFAIRS			
Burning Conscience—Eatherly and Anders		4.00	8.50
Guerrilla Warfare—Guevara		3.50	8.00
The Empire Of Oil—O'Connor		5.00	9.00
World Crisis In Oil—O'Connor	cloth	7.50	11.00
	paper	3.95	8.50
LATIN AMERICA			
The Man At The Door With The Gun—Belfrage		4.50	9.00
Whither Latin America?—Fuentes and others	cloth	3.00	7.50
	paper	1.75	7.00
Puerto Rico: Freedom And Power In The Caribbean—Lewis		10.00	14.00
The Ordeal Of British Guiana—Reno	cloth	3.25	8.00
	paper	1.45	7.00
CUBA			
Inside The Cuban Revolution—Gilly		2.50	7.00
Cuba: Anatomy Of A Revolution—Huberman and Sweezy	cloth	3.50	8.00
	paper	1.75	7.00
The Second Revolution In Cuba—Morray		3.25	8.00
The United States, Cuba, And Castro—Williams		3.25	8.00
CHINA			
Notes From China—Robinson	paper	.75	6.75
The Great Road—Smedley		6.75	10.50
China Triumphs—Alvarez del Vayo		5.00	9.00
NOVEL			
The Ragged Trousered Philanthropists—Tressell		6.00	10.00
POETRY			
Report To The Stockholders—Beecher		3.00	7.50
THE ARTS			
Review I—Weisinger and others	cloth	3.00	7.50
	paper	1.00	7.00

(*All foreign subs, add $1 to price quoted.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

I would like to subscribe to

MONTHLY REVIEW

☐ 1 year $6 ☐ 2 years $10 ☐ 3 years $14

NAME .....

STREET .....

CITY ..... STATE ..... ZIP .....

☐ New Sub ☐ Renewal

I enclose $..... for ..... year subscription.

I enclose $..... for 1 year subscription plus

..... (See pages 62 and 63.)

(name of book)

Special subscription rate to students — $4.00

Name of college .....

Fr. ☐ Soph. ☐ Jr. ☐ Sr. ☐ grad. school ☐

FOREIGN RATES:

One year, $7; by 1st class mail, $9; by air mail, North America $11, South America and Europe $15, Asia, Africa, Australia $17.

Send your order, with payment enclosed, to

Monthly Review 333 Sixth Ave. New York, N. Y. 10014

MR PRESS

PAPERBACKS

Explosion over Latin America: The Man at the Door with the Gun by Cedric Belfrage	$ 2.75
The American Revolution by James Boggs	1.00
Capitalism Yesterday And Today by Maurice Dobb	1.00
Whither Latin America? by Carlos Fuentes and Others	1.75
Man's Worldly Goods by Leo Huberman	2.95
Cuba: Anatomy Of A Revolution by Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy	1.75
The Accumulation Of Capital by Rosa Luxemburg	3.95
Parliamentary Socialism by Ralph Miliband	3.45
The Socialist Register, 1965 by Ralph Miliband and John Saville, Editors	3.45
World Crisis in Oil by Harvey O'Connor	3.95
The Alienation Of Modern Man by Fritz Pappenheim	2.45
The Ordeal Of British Guiana by Philip Reno	1.45
Notes From China by Joan Robinson	.75
The Present As History by Paul M. Sweezy	2.95
Review 1 by Weisinger and others	1.00
TOTAL	$34.60

PAPERBACK SPECIAL

All the above books **$25.00**

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(*continued from inside front cover*)

The Man At The Door With The Gun by Cedric Belfrage is now available in a paperback edition (list price $2.75; prepub price $1.75). Because the title, however pungent, does not make clear that the book is about Latin America, the paperback title will be *Explosion Over Latin America: The Man At The Door With The Gun.*

Harvey O'Connor's book, *World Crisis In Oil,* is also available now in paperback (list price, $3.95; prepub price $2.75). This is a must book for serious people and we are happy to be able to offer it to our readers at a considerable saving over the $7.50 price of the clothbound book. Publication date for both these paperbacks is October, so buy *now* and save.

You will help us considerably if you order *immediately* the books you will want. The financial outlay for all these new titles is by our standards very large, and MR Press urgently needs the money to pay its bills.

The critical response to Review I—1965, MR's Cultural Supplement, has been gratifying. Almost everybody thinks the format is superb, though there is disagreement on the contents—raves from many, adverse criticism from some. Financially, the experiment has not yet paid off. We had hoped to interest particularly young people of college age. If you have a son or daughter, brother or sister or friend in college, we hope you will order a copy for him or her—and for yourself, if you have not yet seen it.

The letter of the month comes from a reader in Australia:

"Bravo! Adolfo Gilly's *The Guerrilla Movement In Guatemala* is the most illuminating and stirring report since your *Cuba: Anatomy Of A Revolution.*

"And your May and June Editorials are superb.

"I hope you will make Gilly's report into a pamphlet, using your May Editorial as an Introduction, and the June one as an Epilogue thereto. It would be one of the most compelling pamphlets ever issued."

Many other readers have asked that the Gilly report be reprinted as a small book. This is not feasible at this time, but copies of both the May and June issues of MR are still available at $1 for the two—cheaper than a book, or a pamphlet this size, would be.

The students' revolt at Berkeley which was front-page news when it was happening is no longer news—except to the defendants who are faced with the problem of raising funds for fines and to appeal the judges' decision. Those who want to help are asked to send their donations to the FSM Defense Fund, Box 448, Berkeley, California.

Professors, students, and any interested socialists are invited to attend a Socialist Scholars Conference on Saturday and Sunday, September 11-12 at Rutgers University. Among those participating in the four panels and dinner program will be Conor Cruise O'Brien, H. H. Wilson, and Staughton Lynd. The editors of MR plan to attend and we strongly urge those in the area who can to be there. For further information write: Box 266, Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn, 333 Jay St., Brooklyn, New York 11201.

If you need educational literature on the United States position in the Far East to give to wavering friends, we recommend an article "What Is Our Role in East Asia?" by D. F. Fleming, author of the monumental two-volume study *The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917-1960.* A sample copy will be sent on request, and additional copies may be ordered at the rate of $4 a hundred (no orders for fewer than 25 copies). Address requests and orders to: D. F. Fleming, 4721 Sewanee Road, Nashville, Tennessee.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MR PRESS

proudly announces the forthcoming publication
of the long-awaited book

MONOPOLY CAPITAL

by Paul A. Baran and Paul M. Sweezy

Table of Contents

Preface
1. Introduction
2. The Giant Corporation
3. The Tendency of Surplus to Rise
4. The Problem of Surplus Absorption: Capitalists' Consumption and Investment
5. The Problem of Surplus Absorption: The Sales Effort
6. The Problem of Surplus Absorption: Civilian Government
7. The Problem of Surplus Absorption: Militarism and Imperialism
8. On the History of Monopoly Capitalism
9. Monopoly Capitalism and Race Relations
10. The Quality of Monopoly Capitalist Society
11. The Irrational System

Appendix: "Measuring the Surplus," by Joseph Phillips

List Price: $8.75
Prepublication price: $6.00

Send your order, with payment enclosed, to

Monthly Review Press, 333 Sixth Ave., N. Y., N. Y. 10014

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED